



 FINANCIAL PROVISIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 








Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of 
Masters of Environmental Law 
In the College of Law and Management Studies 
University of Kwazulu-Natal 
 
2017 
Supervisor: Avishkaar Ramdhin 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
1 CHAPTER ONE:  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION ........................................ 7 
1.1 Environmental Liabilities On Industrial Sites .......................................................................... 7 
1.2 Why Industrial Sites? ............................................................................................................ 10 
1.3 Commercial Situations .......................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 The legal problem ................................................................................................................. 12 
1.5 Research Question ................................................................................................................ 13 
1.6 Limitations of Study .............................................................................................................. 13 
1.7 Methodology and structure of research paper .................................................................... 14 
2 CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY .................. 15 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 A Legal Framework for Environmental Obligations .............................................................. 17 
2.2.1 Environmental Duties.................................................................................................... 18 
2.2.2 Common Law ................................................................................................................ 23 
2.2.3 Environmental administrative requirements ................................................................ 24 
3 CHAPTER THREE: CLARIFYING THE CHALLENGES WITH ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITIES ON INDUSTRIAL SITES ............................................................................... 29 
3.1 The overall challenge ............................................................................................................ 29 
3.2 Scope and Challenges with Environmental Liability ............................................................. 29 
3.2.1 The Cost of Environmental Liabilities on Industrial Sites .............................................. 29 
3.2.2 Environmental Damage ................................................................................................. 30 
3.2.3 The Shortfall in Financial Provisioning .......................................................................... 32 
3.2.4 An Issue of Competence ............................................................................................... 34 
3.3 Affected Parties -The Polluter, the State and Liquidators .................................................... 35 
3.3.1 The Polluter ................................................................................................................... 35 
3.3.2 The State as a trustee ................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.3 Liquidators .................................................................................................................... 40 
3.4 The impact on commercial dealings ..................................................................................... 41 
3.4.1 A purchaser and seller .................................................................................................. 41 
3.4.2 Due diligence, indemnities and warranties in sales ...................................................... 43 
3.4.3 Winding up a business .................................................................................................. 43 
4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IRELANDS APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES ....................................................................................... 46 
4.1 The European Union ............................................................................................................. 46 
3 
 
4.2 Ireland and Environmental Liabilities ................................................................................... 48 
4.2.1 Guidance on Environmental Liability, Risk Assessment, Residual Management Plans 
and Financial Provision ................................................................................................................. 49 
4.2.2 Guidance on Assessing and Costing Environmental Liabilities ..................................... 50 
4.2.3 Guidance on Financial Provision for Environmental Liabilities ..................................... 51 
5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......... 57 
5.1 South Africa's Natural Resource Law and the White Paper on Environmental Liability ...... 57 
5.2 Steps towards a Holistic Environmental Liability Regime for South African ........................ 58 
5.2.1 Defining Environmental Damage, Environmental Liabilities and Financial Provisions . 58 
5.2.2 Identifying high risk industries ...................................................................................... 59 
5.2.3 Existing facilities and new facilities ............................................................................... 60 
5.2.4 Systematic step wise approach ..................................................................................... 60 
5.2.5 Section 24E and 24P of NEMA ...................................................................................... 60 
5.3 Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................................. 61 




I, Bronwyn Parker, hereby declare that: 
 
1. this research paper is my own work and I have not copied the work of another student 
or author; 
2. the written work is entirely my own except where other sources are acknowledged; 
3. collaboration in the writing of this dissertation or the copying of another student’s 
work constitutes cheating for which I may be excluded from the University; and 
4. this research paper has not been submitted in this or similar form in another module at 
this or any other University. 
 
__________________________ 
Bronwyn Parker  
 




















This paper looks at the management of environmental liabilities in South Africa with a 
specific emphasis on industrial sites. The focus on industrial sites is due to the illustrated 
environmental legacy issues which arise from these sites and the fact that our natural 
resources legislation does not correctly emphasise, and ensure provision for the financial 
implications of these liabilities. The lack of statutory regulation has created an environmental 
debt exposure for many unsuspecting persons and contributes to the proliferation of 
environmental degradation. To highlight the potential inadequacy of the legislation, this 
paper considers the management of these liabilities in two commercial situations, namely the 
sale of business and winding up of a company and examines how the applicable key 
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1 CHAPTER ONE:  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
“Until we connect the profitability of business with the survival of the natural world, we will 
not be able to balance real profits with real losses”.1 
1.1 Environmental Liabilities On Industrial Sites 
The Department of Environmental Affairs ("DEA"), Environmental Inspectorate Unit 
("EMI's") publishes an annual National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 
("NECER")2 that aims to provide an overview of environmental compliance and enforcement 
activities undertaken by the various environmental authorities over the period of a financial 
year.3 The reports highlight, inter alia, operational activities relating to industrial sectors 
which are problematic.4 In the preceding five years NECERs have exposed disturbing 
developments concerning environmental liability at various major manufacturers in the South 
African industrial sector.5 The discussed case studies serve to highlight these developments.  
The Old Vanchem Vanadium Basic Oxygen Furnace Slag Disposal Facility ("SDF") in 
Witbank, was owned and operated by Vanchem Vanadium. In 2011 the EMI found that the 
SDF was being operated unlawfully by Vanchem Vanadium, and issued them with a s31H 
request for information notice under the National Environmental Management Act6 
("NEMA") to determine if a s28 NEMA directive could be issued. Vanchem then later in that 
year, sold its Witbank industrial steelmaking complex with SDF to Highveld Steel (known as 
Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium Limited) who, in terms of the sale, assumed Vanchem's 
operational and rehabilitation obligations in respect of the industrial complex and SDF, which 
included compliance with a duty of care directive issued by the EMI's. Evraz Highvelds 
("Highveld") intention with the purchase was the reworking of the SDF to exploit further 
value.7  In 2014 the DEA was informed by Highveld that they were experiencing financial 
constraints, which was hampering progress on obtaining licenses to operate the facility and 
                                                 
1 A Larkin. Environmental Debt: The Hidden Costs of a Changing Global Economy (2013) 6.  
2The Department of Environmental Affairs "Mediation and Law Enforcement"  
https://www.environment.gov.za/otherdocuments/reports#legal (Accessed 5 July 2017). 
3 The Department of Environmental Affairs National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 
(2015/16) 1. 
4 Ibid. 
5National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (See note 3;50); The Department of 
Environmental Affairs. National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (2014/15).  
6 NEMA Act 107 of 1998. 




implement the required directive measures.8 The SDF formed part of a complex steel 
manufacturing operation at Highveld. The DEA also noted that the SDF had additional 
significant environmental non-compliances, such as unlined disposal sites and unlined 
process dams used to convey waste and process water, posing serious contamination risk to 
soil and groundwater due to the nature of the manufacturing operation.9  In 2015 Highveld 
notified the DEA of its intention to commence business rescue proceedings, which was 
subsequently realised.10 When the DEA challenged Highveld about its outstanding 
environmental obligations, Highveld replied that, due to the financial responsibility arising 
out of these obligations and the non-compliances they were struggling to find an investor to 
rescue the business.11  
The facts in this case study epitomise why it is necessary to have a dialogue about 
environmental liabilities on industrial sites.  Highveld had already indicated that it could not 
financially meet its environmental liabilities and, taking cognisance of this fact in all 
probability the environmental liabilities exceeded the value of the business asset.  This raises 
the eventual question of who will pay for these environmental liabilities, in the event that 
Highveld declares insolvency. The answer, simply, the State and taxpayers.  
Another industrial operation, which reaffirms that there is indeed cause for concern, is 
Exxaro Base Metals Zincor refinery (Zincor). Zincor is a historic Zinc manufacturing 
industrial facility located in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality.  Zincor is positioned 
upon a historic gold mining site, which was converted into a uranium processing facility in 
the late 1960’s where, after it was retrofitted, became a zinc metal refinery up until 2010.12 In 
2011 the EMI's noted various environmental non-compliances on the Zincor site, which 
included the disposal of hazardous waste on historic unlined gold tailings storage facilities 
("TSF"), evidence of groundwater contamination as a result of activities and potential surface 
water pollution from the plants' storm and waste water retention dam.13 An Independent 
Competent Persons Report on the Mining Resources of Exxaro Resources 
                                                 
8 The Department of Environmental Affairs. National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report 
(2013/14) 45. 
9 National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (see note 3; 53). 
10 Ibid. 
11National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (see note 3; 54). See also Faku, D "Still hope 
for Evraz asset sale strategy"(2016) http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/still-hope-for-evraz-asset-
sale-strategy-2006203 (Accessed 5 July 2017). 
12 Thomaz, C "Zincor base metals refinery, South Africa" http://www.miningweekly.com/article/zincor-base-
metals-refinery-2006-12-15 (2006) (Accessed 5 July 2017). 
13 National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (see note 7; 45). 
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Limited (" SRK report") confirmed the presence of major environmental damage on the site, 
the foremost features being water contamination plumes from the TSF at approximately 250 
meters from the Blesbokspruit (a tributary of a declared Ramsar Wetland), and extensive soil 
contamination.14 The SRK report noted that Zincor had no financial provision for its closure 
liabilities as it was not statutorily required to make such provision. Exxaro and SRK 
estimated the closure liabilities for Zincor to be in the region of R191 million15 at the end of 
the 2004 financial year.  
In 2013 Zincor indicated to the DEA that it intended on decommissioning the facility, citing 
that the business was no longer viable due to the soaring electricity and transport costs, with 
electricity costing the company R50 million of the R600 million operational cost in 2006.16 It 
is, however, suspected that the possibly escalated closure liability may have been a major 
contributing factor. Assuming that Zincor was in the process of decommissioning, in 2015 
the DEA's Directorate of Land Remediation still considered the site to pose a significant risk 
to the environment and issued Zincor with an urgent remediation order.17  The remediation 
order is indicative of the fact that Exxaro may not have the necessary resolve to address the 
significant environmental liability or that it is not in a position financially to provide for these 
liabilities, thus allowing the environment to be subjected to further degradation. 
The Zincor case serves to further highlight the environmental liability cost burden associated 
with the decommissioning and remediation of industrial complexes and the fact that whilst 
commercial solutions are sought to address this burden, they take time and may ultimately 
result in the entity opting for insolvency to evade liability.  
This paper will take a closer look at the management of environmental liabilities in South 
Africa, with a specific emphasis on industrial sites.18 The focus on industrial sites is due to 
the illustrated environmental legacy issues which arise from these sites and the fact that our 
natural resources legislation does not correctly emphasise and ensure provision for the 
financial implications of these liabilities. This lack of statutory regulation has created an 
environmental debt exposure for many unsuspecting persons and the proliferation of 
                                                 
14 SRK Consulting Engineers An Independent Competent Persons Report on the Mining Resources of Exxaro 
Resources Limited http://www.exxaro.com/pdf/icpr/g/em/zincor.htm  (Accessed 5 July 2017).  
15 Ibid. 
16Rees, M "Exxaro to shut Zincor" (2011) http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/exxaro-to-shut-zincor/ 
(Accessed 19 June 2017). 
17 National Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Report (see note 3; 55). 
18 Industrial sites in this context include all types of manufacturing plants, refineries and the waste dump sites 
which are utilised by these industries.  
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environmental degradation.19 To highlight the potential inadequacy of the legislation, this 
paper will consider the management of these liabilities in two commercial situations, namely 
the sale of business and winding up of a company and how the applicable key legislation 
addresses these liabilities. 
1.2 Why Industrial Sites?  
Some of the major impacts from industrial sites include pollution of land, air and the water 
resources surrounding the site.20 The problem is that the majority of South African industrial 
sites are not legally obligated to have in place a financial provision as security for some of 
their environmental liabilities, in contrast to that of the mining and petroleum industries 
which require license holders to have rehabilitation and closure provisions.21 As a result, in 
the industrial sector, environmental liabilities are usually unaccounted for, leaving the 
authorities, tax payers and purchasers financially exposed should the facility be passed on in 
a corporate transaction or face insolvency.22 In the latter situation, a liquidator will have a 
limited supply of funds to meet the manufacturer's environmental liabilities, let alone 
                                                 
19See Mathee, A. J, 'Environment and health in South Africa: Gains, Losses and opportunities' (2011) Public 
Health Vol 32 (Suppl 1): S40. See Cock J, Connecting the red, brown and green: The environmental justice 
movement in South Africa (2004). A UKZN Case Study: Globalisation, Marginalisation & New Social 
Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Cocks discusses the proliferation of environmental justice 
movements, her paper however exposes some of the major industrial polluters in South Africa, such as Iscor , 
Engen, Sapref and these movements responses to the environmental liability issues being experienced by the 
surrounding communities.  See also Sparks, 'SA Long History: Civil Society, Pollution and the Wentworth Oil 
Refinery' Centre For Civil Society Research Report No.45 University of Kwazulu-Natal And University of 
Michigan (accessed 20 June 2017 http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/RREPORT_VOL106_SPARKS.pdf.  Sparks 
discusses the history of air pollution challenges experienced by surrounding communities from the Wentworth 
Oil Refinery. See McDonald D, Environmental Justice in South Africa: Double Speak in Durban. Mondi ,Waste 
Management and the Struggles of the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (2002) 202. This paper 
discusses the various environmental challenges experienced by the South Durban community in respect of 
surrounding industrial manufacturers. The challenges range from poor management of hazardous waste landfills 
and dumps which includes substances such as chrome, exposure of children to organo phosphate dumped in an 
exposed area on a manufacturer's site, complaints against Mondi for poor management of ash waste dumped on 
its property and SO2 pollution.  Whilst these papers focus on the human health impact, it is noteworthy that 
these industries are not legally obliged to ensure their environmental liabilities are funded. 
20Mathee (see note 19; S40). 
21MPRDA Act 28 of 2002; GG 26275, 23 April 2004, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Regulations, Regulation 53 and 54 and Act 102 of 1977; GG 287, 27 March 2006, Regulations Regarding 
Petroleum Products Wholesale Licenses, Regulation 10 and 11; GG286, 27 March  2006, Regulations regarding 
Petroleum Products Site and Retail Licenses, Regulation 9 and 10. 
22See T Carnie, "Decades of Toxic Waste Not Cleared Up" (2012) http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/decades-of-
toxic-waste-not-cleared-up-1227577 (accessed 05 July 2017); E Hamilton, 'The Poisoned Land' (2015) 
Noseweek Issue #193, 1st November http://www.noseweek.co.za/article/3539/The-poisoned-
land#sthash.4gk31RF6.dpuf (Accessed 05 July 2017) and See McBarron, M. “The implications to industrial 
sites of risk and hazard-based approaches to managing land contamination.”(2006) IChemE Symposium series- 
https://www.icheme.org/communities/subject_groups/safety%20and%20loss%20prevention/resources/hazards%
20archive/~/media/Documents/Subject%20Groups/Safety_Loss_Prevention/Hazards%20Archive/XIX/XIX-
Paper-12.pdf (accessed 05 July 2017). 
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contemplate remediation. In the mining and petroleum sectors, holders of licenses23 are 
required in intervals as described in their environmental management programme ("EMP"), 
to account for their remediation by assessing the closure, environmental remediation and 
latent liability costs associated with their operations.24 In the mining sector this provision is 
protected in the event of insolvency of the mining rights holder.25  
 
Aspects which are considered in the financial provisioning process for these sites include 
costs associated with rehabilitation of the surface area, prevention and management of 
pollution of water and soil, and engineering solutions which prevent leakage from the site.26 
The final aspect would include costs associated with post closure management of residual and 
latent environmental impacts.27 These measures are key for ensuring the financial burden 
associated with the cost of remediation and rehabilitation is passed to the polluter, the state is 
provided with sureties and holders of licenses, and the purchaser of these assets is financially 
equipped to deal with these costs, even in the event of unplanned closure. It is, however, 
acknowledged that this is not a sure measure and that it has its challenges, but it is 
nonetheless more than what is legally required of industrial sites.28 
1.3 Commercial Situations 
It is assumed that the corporate history of Highveld and Zincor is not unique and resonates 
with many manufacturing facilities in South Africa, having at some stage been the subject of 
a share sale or asset purchase transaction, the focus of a business rescue or insolvency 
proceeding. Considering the extent of the environmental damage which has emanated from 
Highveld and Zincor, it is vital for us to assess these commercial situations and consider if 
further regulatory control could have averted the ongoing mismanagement of environmental 
                                                 
23 MPRDA Act 28 of 2002, s41 which has been replaced with NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24P which states that 
holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits require a financial provision. Under the 
Petroleum Products Act 102 of 1997, Regulation 286 and 287, operators of petroleum product sites and holders 
of wholesale and retail licenses are required to cost for a financial provision for site rehabilitation.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid note 23. See NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24P(6) which provides that " The Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 
24 of 1936), does not apply to any form of financial provision contemplated in subsection (1) and all amounts 
arising from that provision." 
26 Ibid note 21. 
27MPRDA Act 28 of 2002; GG26275, 23 April 2004, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Regulations at Regulation 53 and 54. 
28 Petroleum Refineries are not included under the definition of petroleum product sites, wholesalers or retailers. 
See also Van Zyl H…et al "Financial Provisions for Rehabilitation and Closure in South African Mining: 




liabilities.29 As for the looming insolvency threat, it is pertinent to understand the statutory 
position of the State, the purchasers and liquidators with respect to environmental liability 
costs and if these parties will be lumped with these liabilities. 
 
The corporate transactions which will be considered in this discussion are share purchase and 
asset purchase transactions. The transaction between Vanchem Vanadium and Highveld 
involved a share purchase transaction of majority shares in the Vanchem Vanadium 
Company. The difference between a share and asset purchase will be highlighted with respect 
to the duties of the seller and purchaser in respect of transferring environmental liabilities. 
1.4 The legal problem 
Highveld and Zincor only represent two of many industrial sites in South Africa, all of which 
probably have more or less similar environmental liabilities.30 The situation in which the 
Highveld and Zincor find themselves should cause alarm bells to siren and raise question 
about who fits the bill for the ‘environmental liabilities’ associated with these sites?  There 
are some predominant problems with pollution, which make the calculation of this ‘liability’ 
challenging. Firstly, the issue of associating liability is not easy, due to the complexity around 
pinpointing the sources of pollution, especially historical pollution on a site like Zincor. 
When  a business is facing a constrained financial situation these liabilities can often exceed 
the value of the actual asset. Without a type of financial provision to, at minimum, provide 
security for the environmental liabilities of these sites, it is likely that this financial burden 
may fall squarely on unsuspecting purchasers, liquidators, or, by default, onto the State.31  
 
This paper aims to answer the following questions: 
 
i. What are ‘environmental liabilities’ in the South African context and how are these 
currently funded by high risk industrial polluters other than mines? 
ii. What challenges do these liabilities pose? 
                                                 
29 T Carnie, "Decades of toxic Waste Not Cleared Up" (2012) http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/decades-of-toxic-
waste-not-cleared-up-1227577 (accessed 05 July 2017). It is alleged that a demerger was undertaken by Thor 
chemicals as a way to escape legal damages claims of ill workers.   
30 Ibid note 19. See McDonald D, Environmental Justice in South Africa: Cripple for Life by Mercury Exposure 
(2002) 289. This paper discusses the exposure of employees at Thor chemicals to mercury waste as well as the 
exposure of the waste to the environment, and its possible knock on effects. 
31Ibid note 29. The article exposes the potential cost liability of the State in respect of remediation of the Thor 




iii. Who are the parties potentially exposed to environmental liabilities? 
iv. Are environmental liability costs a concern unique to South Africa or is there 
international precedent for these costs? 
v. What are the proposed solutions to these challenges? 
 
These questions will be unpacked by looking at industrial sites to illustrate the significant 
legislative gap that exists in the management of environmental liabilities in South Africa and 
the possible solution, which is borrowed from foreign jurisdictions. 
1.5 Research Question  
Environmental liabilities in the South Africa mining and petroleum sector are financially 
managed by obligatory legislated financial provisions. However, the status of environmental 
liability on other industrial sites, which cause significant environmental pollution, is 
unknown along with the question of what happens to these liabilities in the event of 
insolvency or sale of these businesses. 
1.6 Limitations of Study  
Not all industrial sites have significant environmental liability costs as each site would be 
unique in its operation, and certain operators may be more vigilant about their statutory 
obligations than others. It is an acknowledged limitation of this discussion that an assumption 
is made regarding the significance of the cost associated with environmental liabilities on 
industrial sites, the main focus of the paper however being on high risk industrial sites.  It is 
not the intention of this paper to discuss the adequacy of South Africa’s fiscal system to cater 
for financial provision instruments as this would extend beyond the scope of the paper. 
Furthermore, this paper does not intend to recommend the appropriate financial provision 
mechanisms which may be utilised by an industrial manufacture. It is, however, noteworthy 
that there are concerns raised by finance experts around the tax implications and 
administrative management of financial provision instruments which may affect which 
mechanisms are appropriate.32 Moreover, at the time of writing, the United Kingdom is in the 
process, of putting in place plans to assist it with exiting the European Union. The effect 
hereof upon Ireland's legislative regime around the polluter pays principle, insofar as the Irish 
legislation accommodates for the obligations contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union which deal with the principle, is currently unknown.  
                                                 
32Khaki , S. "Integritax Newsletter Online" (2015) https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2015/2389 ._Provision_ 
for_mining_rehabilitation.htm (Accessed 19 May 2017). 
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1.7 Methodology and structure of research paper 
The methodology utilised to compile this research paper was limited to literature reviews of 
both primary and secondary sources and based on experience of the writer. The paper is 
structured in Chapters, of which Chapter One is the Introduction around the challenges of 
environmental liabilities on Industrial Site, Chapter Two discusses the concept of 
environmental liability as it is catered for in the natural resource legislation. Chapter Three 
indicates the challenges with these liabilities and the parties exposed in the event of sale of a 
business and insolvency. Chapter Four discusses the European Union's and particularly 
Ireland’s approach to environmental liabilities on industrial sites.  The European Union was 
selected due to the focus placed on the internationally recognised polluter pays principle in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Ireland as the international 
comparative country, as this principle has shaped the country's approach to environmental 
liability33. Similarly, in South Africa, the principle is incorporated into a majority of the 
country’s environmental laws. The principle in the South African context inter alia, is 
utilised to internalise cost associated with pollution34, is used to disincentivise  unlawful 
behaviour35 and forms one of the principles against which our umbrella environmental 
legislation is interpreted36.   
 
The concluding chapter, Chapter Five, will contain recommendations and a proposal on how 
to manage these challenges, the substance of which is founded upon international sources.  
                                                 
33 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. [174], 2008 O.J. C. 115, at [2]. 
34A Patterson ..et al. Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives. 1st 
ed.(2009) Chapter 12: 302. 
35 Patterson (34:54) Chapter 3. 




2 CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Introduction  
In natural resource law, the concept of 'environmental liability' is usually associated with the 
financial provision for rehabilitation in the mining and petroleum industries37 and 
enforcement actions taken by authorities.38 
 
In the mining sector, applicants for an environmental authorisation relating to mining 
activities must, in accordance with s24P(1) of NEMA, first comply with the financial 
provisions relating to rehabilitation, closure and ongoing post decommissioning management 
of negative environmental impacts before their authorisation is granted.39 Holders are then 
required to assess their ‘environmental liability’ in a prescribed manner40 and increase the 
financial provision to the satisfaction of the Minister, responsible for environmental affairs to 
adequately cater for the liability.  The sum of this liability is calculated by considering the 
cost associated with rehabilitation and remediation of the mining area; decommissioning and 
closure activities at the end of prospecting, exploration, mining or production operations; and 
remediation and management of latent or residual environmental impacts which may become 
known in future, including the pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water.41  
 
Holders of site, wholesale, retail and petroleum production licenses are, under the Petroleum 
Products Act ("PPA")42 Regulations, similarly required to provide a total quantum for the 
rehabilitation, management and remediation of negative environmental impacts.43 Under the 
                                                 
37Ibid note 23. 
38F Soltau, The National Environmental Management Act and liability for environmental damage (1999) 6 
SAJELP 48-49; M Kidd, Liability of corporate officers for environmental offences (2003) 18 SA Public Law  
277 –288. 
39NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24P (1). This Section was preceded by Section 41(1) of the Minerals and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002.  
40NEMA Act 107 of 1998, GG 1147, 20 November 2015, The Financial Provision for Prospecting, 
Exploration, Mining or Production Operations Regulations sets out this prescribed manner. It is however 
important to note that Regulation 53- 60 contained in GG 26275,23 April 2004, Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Regulations has not been repealed and as such holders are encouraged to assess the 
requirements of both Regulations when undertaking annual evaluation of liability obligations. 
41See Act MPRDA 28 of 2002, GG 26275, 23 April 2004, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Regulations Regulation 56 and GG 1147, 20 November 2015 Financial Provision for Prospecting, Exploration, 
Mining or Production Operations Regulations. 
42PPA Act 102 of 1997, GG287, 27 March 2006, Regulations Regarding Petroleum Products Wholesale 
Licenses, Regulation 10 and 11 and GG286, 27 March 2006, Regulations Regarding Petroleum Products Site 




PPA Regulations, the quantum of the financial provision must include a sum for 
decommissioning and final closure, post closure management of residual and latent impacts 
as well as a separate provision for premature closure of the facility.44 The quantum of the 
financial provision for premature closure must be validated by a specialist assessment, which 
assesses the cost of the activities associated with rehabilitation of land, prevention of 
pollution of the atmosphere, management of pollution of water and the soil and the 
prevention of spillage and leakage into the ground of chemical substances introduced onto the 
site.45 
 
The following aspects are noteworthy when considering the extent of these environmental 
liabilities: 
 the construct of these obligations, to put in place a financial provision, bear the 
characteristics of the 'polluter pays principle'46;  
 NEMA only places this obligation on holders of a mining authorisation and not 
petroleum product license holders, as there is industry specific legislation therefore47; 
 NEMA only requires these holders to ensure that an adequate financial provision is 
available for the listed environmental liabilities (i.e liabilities associated with mine 
closure)48 and no other liabilities; 
 neither NEMA and/or any other national natural resource legislation contain similar 
statutory provision for other significant polluting industries; and  
 there is no other national natural resource legislation which links environmental 
liability with financial implications, other than under the threat of enforcement 
actions.49 
 
These aspects are problematic, considering the fact that our natural resource legislation 
comprises various other environmental liabilities which can be associated to various 
                                                 
44PPA Act 102 of 1997, GG287, 27 March 2006, Regulations Regarding Petroleum Products Wholesale 
Licenses,  Regulation 11 (3) and GG286, 27 March 2006, Regulations Regarding Petroleum Products Site and 
Retail Licenses, Regulation 10(3). 
45 Ibid. 
46The Polluter Pays Principle – Definition, Analysis, Implementation, Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Report. Environment Directorate. France. (1975)12. 
47 Ibid 44. 
48 Ibid 41. 
49 See F Soltau, The National Environmental Management Act and liability for environmental damage (1999) 6 




industries and persons dependant on their actions.50 What then are these other environmental 
liabilities and how are they being funded?  To answer these questions, it is important to 
understand that the word 'liability' is synonymous with words such as legal responsibility, 
obligation and charges.51 
2.2 A Legal Framework for Environmental Obligations 
Within the context of environmental auditing52 the source of environmental obligations are 
said to be a combination of environmental duties, environmental administrative requirements 
and common law obligations placed on ‘polluters’ to implement reasonable measures to 
regulate their actions.53  
 
Industries are often not aware of all their environmental obligations and the actual cost 
implications of these obligations, as our legislation does not draw a distinctive connection 
between these obligations and their financial implications, as has been done for the mining 
and petroleum industries.54  This is often the reason why these obligations are unfunded 
and/or underfunded, leading to non-compliances. This lack of awareness is also problematic 
for business transactions, such as sale of a business or for liquidators in insolvency.  
 
This legal framework will demonstrate that, to a large degree, all environmental damage 
associated with industrial manufacturers is regulated by an environmental obligation 
contained in our natural resource legislation and that these obligations always have a 
financial consequence, an aspect of environmental liability in South Africa often overlooked.  
                                                 
50 See for example NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28 the 'duty of care' obligation.  The remainder obligations are 
discussed in paragraph 2.1.1. 
51Oxford Living Dictionary. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/liability (Accessed: 22 May 2017).   
52Sampson I…et al. In: Environmental Due Diligence Audits. A guide to environmental auditing in South 
Africa.(2008). 8, Par 1.1. Environmental audits are defined by international bodies in several different manners. 
Highlighted here is only one definition compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – "a 
management tool comprising of systematic, documented, periodic and objective evaluation of how well 
environmental organisation, management and equipment are performing with the aim of contributing to safe 
guarding the environment by facilitating management control of environmental practices and assessing 
compliance with company policy, which includes meeting regulatory requirements." 
53 Sampson (52: Par 2.4). 
54Centre for Environmental Rights ("CER") Full disclosure the truth about corporate environmental compliance 
in South Africa (2015), http://fulldisclosure.cer.org.za/2015/download/CER-Full-Disclosure.pdf (Accessed 22 
May 2017). This report discloses numerous compliance concerns relating to different mining and manufacturing 
industries, and the discrepancies between the disclosures made by these in their financial reporting and the 
actual environmental compliance concerns.  Whilst the report does not pin point lack of awareness of 
environmental obligations as a factor which has contributed to the environmental non-compliances it does 
highlight the fact that numerous of the corporates identify hold the view that the identified "non-compliance 
constitute an “opinion” or “interpretation” of the Environmental Management Inspectors". This is concerning as 
it implies a lack of awareness as a contributing factor to identified non-compliance. See Executive Summary, 2.      
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2.2.1 Environmental Duties  
Legislation which regulates environmental management from national to local level may 
contain specific environmental duties55 which find application to various industries and 
persons dependant on the specific circumstance. As such, it should be acknowledged that the 
circumstances of each manufacturer will dictate the applicable environmental duties. There is 
however, framework legislation which contains universal duties, such as the 'general duty of 
care' with respect to the management of the environment as a whole, which duty is found in 
s 28 of NEMA.  
 
The duty of care principle is not explicitly mentioned or explained in the the White Paper on 
Environmental Policy in South Africa (“the White Paper 1998”), but if one considers the 
expression of the principle in s28 of NEMA, it is easy to see that the principle can be said to 
be a combination of the ‘prevention’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles, both of which are 
discussed in the White Paper. As stated in s28 of NEMA56–  
 
"Every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or 
degradation of the environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such 
pollution or degradation from occurring, continuing or recurring, or, in so far as 
such harm to the environment is authorised by law or cannot reasonably be 
avoided or stopped, to minimise and rectify such pollution or degradation of the 
environment." 
 
In the international environmental law context the ‘prevention principle’ was first recognised 
as an obligation on States to prevent transboundary environmental harm.57 The principle was, 
however, developed when codified into various countries' national legislation, as a principle 
which requires activities which will cause environmental harm to first be prevented58. To this 
end, this principle requires action to be taken as an early stage of the process before damage 
has actually occurred.59  In s28 of NEMA, the ‘prevention principle’ is expressed in the first 
                                                 
55 Sampson (52: Par 2.4.2). 
56 NEMA Act 107 of 1998,s28(1). 
57Arbitral Trail Smelter Case 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941)1965 and See UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) / 31 ILM 874 (1992) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development- Principle 
2, which in summary requires States to ensure that activities in their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States. 
58Ibid (46:15). 
59J Glazewski, Environmental Law in South Africa 2ed (2005) 18. 
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part of the duty, so polluters are required to first prevent significant pollution by taking 
reasonable measures and then in the second part they have an obligation to rectify the 
significant pollution or degradation, which is an expression of the ‘polluter pays principle’, as 
it places the onus on "every person who has caused…pollution to pay the repair costs".   
 
Soltau, observes that the strength of the s28 principle lies in its ‘generality’, as in the context 
of NEMA it can be used  as an enforcement tool for past, present and future pollution and is 
considered an ‘environmental value’, enforceable even beyond the issuance of a permission 
to pollute, placing an ongoing duty on ‘everyone’ to minimise and rectify pollution.60 
 
Practically, if this principle is applied to an industrial manufacturing site which shows signs 
of significant pollution on the premises, it means that the manufacturer has failed in its 
ongoing environmental duty of care and is required, in order to avoid enforcement measures, 
to take reasonable measures to minimise and rectify the past61, present and avoid future 
pollution. These measures in terms of s28 can include- 
 
(a) investigate, assess and evaluate the impact on the environment, (b) cease, modify 
or control any act, (c) contain or prevent the movement of pollutants or the cause of 
degradation, and (d) remedy the effects of the pollution.62  
 
Beyond the general duty of care in respect of the environment as an all-encompassing object 
of this duty, environmental media which receives a significant amount of attention in respect 
of environmental duties is land and water, which is possibly due to the susceptibility of these 
media to source based pollution risks63. 
 
The environmental duties in respect of contaminated land are described in Chapter 4, Part 8 
of National Environmental Management Waste Act ("NEMWA").64 Contamination is defined 
broadly in the NEMWA as65 – 
 
                                                 
60Soltau(38; 48-49).  
61 NEMA Act 107 of 1998,s28(1A).  
62 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(3)(a)-(f). 
63South African. Dept. Envir. Affairs. Framework for the Management of Contaminated Land, (2010) 8. The 
focus of this Framework is source pollution of land and water resources.  
64 NEMWA Act 59 of 2008. 
65 Ibid note 58. 
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"the presence in or under any land, site, buildings or structures of a substance or 
micro-organism above the concentration that is normally present in or under that 
land, which substance or micro-organism directly or indirectly affects or may 
affect the quality of soil or the environment adversely."  
 
NEMWA places an environmental duty on an owner of land that is significantly (own 
emphasis) contaminated to notify the Minister responsible for Environmental Affairs, of the 
contamination and on issuance of an order from the Minister, requires the owner to compile a 
site assessment report and undertake remediation if required.66 The Framework for the 
Management of Contaminated Land67 provides insight into the complexities of pollution on 
this media, as it proposes a "multi-tiered based methodological approach to the assessment of 
contaminated land which approach allows proponents to identify contaminant linkages to the 
environment".68 The pollution of this media does not only affect natural resources 
independently, but usually occurs through multiple natural resource channels, each having a 
contaminant linkage to the pollution source. 
 
NEMA and NEMWA have two noteworthy points in common when considering the context 
of these environmental duties. The Acts both refer to the notion of retrospectivity69 and 
significant pollution.70  The management of environmental legacy pollution is a challenge for 
the polluter and authorities alike, which is why the legislators have made provision for 
retrospective liability for these environmental duties.71 The inclusion of retrospectivity in 
both these abovementioned Acts has various consequences, namely:  
 a person who caused pollution through historical activities is obliged to take the 
requisite measures described in the Acts72; and 
 a person73 may utilise the available enforcement instruments to enforce their rights to 
address environmental legacy pollution issues74. 
 
                                                 
66 Act 59 of 2008,s36-38. 
67 Ibid note 63, See Preface.  
68 Ibid note(63: 8). 
69 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(1A); Act 59 of 2008,s35(a). 
70 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(1); Act 59 of 2008,s36(5). 
71 Fuggle and Rabie. Environmental Management in South Africa. 2nd ed. (2009) ch1-p26. 
72 Ibid. 
73 NEMA Act 107 of 1998,s28(4) the competent authority; s28(12) 'any person'. 
74 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(4); s31L and s32 applies to the enforcement of NEMWA Act 59 of 2008, s36(5) 
as the responsible person would not be complying with Act NEMWA 59 of 2008, s36(5), if they were not taking 
the requisite measures described in the NEMWA Act 59 of 2008 to report the contamination. 
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The term 'significant' was discussed in the context of 'significant pollution' in the Hichange 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd T/A Pelts Products, And Others75  
("the Hichange case"), wherein the court held that76-  
 a consideration of what is significant involves a considerable measure of subjective 
import;and 
 in light of the Constitutional right a person has a right to 'an environment conducive to 
health and well-being, the threshold of significance is therefore not particularly high. 
 
The effect of Judge Leaches refinement of this term is that the requisite environmental duties 
under NEMA and NEMWA are limited, as they do not allow polluters a significant amount 
of latitude for the pollution or contamination if this is measured by subjective import against 
the s24 environmental right in the Constitution. Similarly, the burden of proof is also not 
substantial for a claimant who may seek to enforce the environmental duty created by these 
environmental obligations. According to the Hichange case, any pollution which offends the 
s24 environmental right is 'significant' and would warrant a claim.77 
 
With respect to water resources, the National Water Act ("NWA")78 at s19 is entitled 
:"prevention and remedying effects of pollution" and is essentially a replica of the s28 
principle.79 The Act however focuses specifically on water resources, and the duty of care in 
s19 states the following80: 
 
                                                 
75 2004 (2) SA 393 (E). 
76 2004 (2) SA 393 (E) 415. 
77 2004 (2) SA 393 (E) 415 where the court held that " Bearing that in mind, no matter what the precise level of 
pollution may currently be, it is clear from a conspectus of the evidence as a whole, including the first 
respondent's own papers and the reports attached thereto, that there has been a pollution of the environment (in 
the sense envisaged by the definition of 'pollution' in NEMA) at a level which must be regarded as 'significant'. 
The first respondent itself, albeit while denying that it is substantial, concedes pollution to the extent normally 
associated with a tannery. As I have already mentioned, immediately before this application was launched the 
first respondent conceded that it was unable to comply with the third respondent's requirements relating to its 
DO and   C MLSS levels, the two components crucial to the formation of H2S. If one bears in mind the 
undisputed evidence that even the most minute concentration of H2S in the atmosphere is detected by the human 
nose as a stink similar to rotten eggs, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the H2S generated by the 
first respondent's processes would regularly have   been detectable to the persons working nearby on the 
premises of the applicant, as the latter alleges. This is confirmed by the deponent to the fourth respondent's 
answering affidavit, one Scarr, who states that he has visited the tannery and that the smell is extremely 
offensive. One should not be obliged to work in an environment of stench and, in my view, to be in an 
environment contaminated by H2S is adverse to one's 'well-being'. I am therefore satisfied that the activities of 
the first respondent have caused 'pollution' as defined in NEMA." 
78 NWA Act 36 of 1998; s19. 
79 The exception being the s19 does not refer to 'significant pollution', but only refers to pollution. It seems that 
it is not necessary for the pollution to be 'significant' before a debtor is obliged to take reasonable measures.   
80 NWA Act 36 of 1998; s19(1). 
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"an owner of land, a person in control of land or a person who occupies or uses the 
land on which any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken or any other 
situation exists which causes, has caused or is likely to cause pollution of water 
resources, must take all reasonable measures to prevent such pollution from 
occurring, continuing or reoccurring.." 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal case of Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd v Regional 
Director: Free State Department of Water Affairs81  (hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 
Harmony Gold case") serves as an illustrative example of the extent of this environmental 
duty and how onerous the "reasonable measures" may become for an operator of an industrial 
site. Some of the legal points made in the 2013 Harmony case about this environmental duty, 
were : 
 that the s19 duty of care is not delimited by the actual time of landholding82;and 
 that the measures required of a landholder are not limited only to the land mentioned 
in subsection 19(1). 83  
 
On a simplistic reading of this duty in s19, the duty requires principal polluters of water 
resources to, on an ongoing basis, take reasonable measures to prevent pollution and, once 
present, to minimise and rectify sources of water pollution from the past, present and prevent 
the materialisation of future pollution.  A principal’s duty, according to the 2013 Harmony 
Case extends beyond the actual time of landholding, meaning that the polluter cannot 'sell' 
himself out of this obligation and that the pollution is not limited to the actual land owned by 
the polluter, but can extend beyond the perimeter of that land.84These are consequences 
which are pertinent when evaluating the extent and potential costs of this environmental duty.  
 
The description of these environmental duties provides insight into the extent of the duties 
and the potential measures required to be taken by industrial manufacturers to meet their 
environmental obligations, to avoid non-compliance. It is inherent that these measures will in 
all respects have a significant cost implication for an owner or operator of an industrial 
                                                 
81 Harmony Gold case 2013 JDR 2812 (SCA).  
82T Humby “The Spectre of Perpetuity Liability for Treating Acid Water on South Africa’s Goldfields: Decision 
in Harmony II” (2013) 31(4) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (JENRL) 416. Judge Makgoka held 
that a severing ties with the land did not relinquish the validly imposed liability and that only fulfilment of the 
imposed obligations could severe such ties with the directive. 




manufacturer, a cost which NEMA and the associated natural resource legislation is silent 
about, not requiring the operator to make provision for these costs at any stage.  What if the 
operator does not have the financial means to meet these obligations, either in the normal 
course of business or through enforcement measures imposed upon the operator as was 
evident with Evraz Highveld? Who is then responsible for the fulfilment of these obligations? 
2.2.2 Common Law  
The s28 of NEMA and s19of NWA duties of care obligations are just a form of codifications 
of the common law duty of care.85 The justification for this obligation at common law is 
possibly founded in the doctrine of abuse of rights, which provides that subjective rights have 
certain social limits  and every 'anti- social' exercise of a person's right is wrongful, and 
therefore an abuse of that right.86 In the context of neighbour law and nuisance, a person who 
undertakes an activity which causes harm to his neighbour or another would have exceeded 
his powers of ownership  which would be an abuses of his rights of ownership. To determine 
the extent of his wrongfulness, the owner would be subject to an objective assessment of 
whether he acted reasonable and fair in the circumstances.87  
 
As an environmental obligation, the obligations arise out of the principles relative to the law 
of nuisance and neighbour law. The value of these common law principles in creating 
environmental obligations over and above the statutory obligations was emphasised in 
Rainbow Chicken Farm (Pty) Ltd v Mediterranean D Woollen Mills (Pty) Ltd 88,  where the 
court held that the pollution of the stream was an actionable nuisance and that –  
 
"a producer of effluent that discharges into a public stream,  quite apart from statutory 
duties imposed on him by sections 21(1) and (2), of the 1956 Water Act owes a 
common law duty of care towards others". 
 
The applicant in this matter was successful in illustrating the nuisance and obtaining an 
interim interdict stopping the respondent from discharging effluent from its dyeing operations 
into the river.89 
 
                                                 
85 Fuggle ..et al (71: 211).  
86 Neethling …et al. Law of Delict.6th ed. (2010) 116. 
87 Neethling..et al (86; 116.116,117 and 118). 
88 1963 (1) SA 201 (N) 205A. 
89Glazewski J.. et al. Environmental Law in South Africa (2005). 24. 
24 
 
The environmental obligation can thus be found in the 'duty of care', that must be taken 
towards others which includes care of the environment to prevent nuisance. 
2.2.3 Environmental administrative requirements 
Environmental administrative requirements are environmental obligations referred to as 
permits, licenses, environmental authorisations and management plans.90Arguably, these 
obligations can also involve enforcement instruments such as directives and compliance 
orders issued upon an entity by the respective enforcement authorities.91   
 
An industrial manufacturer may need to obtain numerous environmental administrative 
authorisations to permit and regulate its activities. Similar to the environmental duties, the 
type of entity and its associated activities will determine which authorisations it needs to 
obtain. As NEMA is the framework legislation, the environmental administrative 
requirements of NEMA will be described to illustrate the effect hereof on environmental 
liability.  
 
The Minister must, in terms of s24(2) of NEMA, identify activities and specific activities in 
geographical areas based on their environmental attributes, which may not commence 
without an environmental authorisation from the competent authority. Environmental 
authorisations must as described under s24E of NEMA, contain ‘minimum conditions’. These 
minimum conditions require that every environmental authorisation must –  
 
 ensure that adequate provision (own emphasis) is made for ongoing management and 
monitoring of impacts of the activity on the environment throughout the lifecycle of 
the activity; and 
 ensure that provision is made for the transfer of rights and obligations. 
 
As a result of these conditions, the authority needs to draft provision into all environmental 
authorisations which at a minimum give effect to the requirements in this section.  There are 
two relevant aspects that must be noted out of this section when considering the realisation of 
potential environmental liability in respect of this obligation.  
 
                                                 
90 Sampson (52: 28) Par 2.4.3. 
91 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(4) and s31L respectively for example of environmental enforcement instrument.  
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The first aspect is the intended meaning of the word ‘provision’. It is uncertain whether the 
legislator intended that the authorities must (a) include a condition in the environmental 
authorisation which directs the holder on how to manage and monitor impacts for the 
lifecycle of the activity, or (b) whether it is intended to prompt the authority to draft a 
condition into the license which requires 'the holder’ to provide proof of provision by a 
financial provision, which would be sufficient for the undertaking of management and 
monitoring obligations for the lifecycle of the activity.  The term 'financial provision' is 
defined in NEMA as92: 
 
"the insurance, bank guarantee, trust fund or cash that applicants for an environmental 
authorisation must provide in terms of this Act guaranteeing the availability of 
sufficient funds to undertake the (a) rehabilitation of the adverse environmental 
impacts of the listed or specified activities;… (c) decommissioning and closure of the 
operations; (d) remediation of latent or residual environmental impacts which become 
known in the future; (e) removal of building structures and other objects; or (f) 
remediation of any other negative environmental impacts. 
 
On this definition, a financial provision only relates to environmental impacts which are 
realised at the end of the life of an activity, which is troublesome, as the minimum conditions 
in terms of s24E specifically refer to management and monitoring for the lifecycle and not 
just at the end of life of the activity. The lifecycle of an activity is understood to be referring 
to all stages of implementation until decommissioning of that activity.93 This understanding is 
discharged from the description of the cradle to grave principle, which is also a material 
principle of environmental management in NEMA, but finds more relevance in connection 
with products from manufacturing facilities.94 This implies that the holders' obligations for 
management and monitoring may, in terms of an environmental authorisation, be 
extinguished on decommissioning of the facility. This is problematic when considering 
industrial activities with environmental impacts that may, exceeds the lifecycle of the 
authorised activity, arising at a later date in the form of residual and latent pollution. 
 
                                                 
92 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s1 Definitions. 





It may be that s24E provides the authority with the discretion to impose a provision in the 
environmental authorisation which deals with all lifecycle phases, including end of life 
activities, which is where the environmental liability is most significant.95 It is proposed that 
either interpretation of this condition has merit, allowing the authorities discretion to insert a 
provision that they see fit for the activity.  
 
The second aspect to s24E of NEMA, then requires the authority to include a condition for 
transfer of rights and obligations under the authorisation. There is however no minimum 
requirement in NEMA or its regulations for the procuring person to be a ‘competent person’ 
as required by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations (hereinafter 
referred to as "the MPRDA Regulations").96 This may be a gap in NEMA as a potential 
purchaser of a business would not, in terms of the current provisions of NEMA, be required 
to prove they have the requisite competency to fulfil the existing environmental obligations 
of the seller. This risk can translate into an environmental liability risk for the State and 
public if the purchaser acquiring the business doesn’t accurately assess or understand its 
potential environmental liability, leading to the purchaser defaulting on its newly acquired 
obligations. The defaulting purchaser could cause a potentially harmful environmental 
situation, which may become a liability for the State97, especially if the seller cannot be 
retraced when the purchaser is found in default of its environmental obligations. It is, 
however, accepted that these are minimum conditions and that there is scope for the 
authorities to expand on the conditions, creating the opportunity for the insertion of a 
‘competency test’ on transfer in the authorisation. 
 
The environmental liability created by environmental administrative requirements is found in 
the cost associated with fulfilling the conditions of the authorisation. These conditions are 
                                                 
95 Framework for the Management of Contaminated Land (63:7).  
96 MPRDA Act 28 of 2002,GG 26275, 23 April 2004, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Regulations, Regulation 59 - "The person to whom such transfer is made must—(a) have the expertise, 
resources and organisational abilities to integrate risk assessment, risk management and risk financing to 
ascertain the cost of environmental management; (b)have the expertise, financial and other resources to meet his 
or her obligations to carry out actions necessary to fulfil the environmental obligations as set out in the 
environmental management plan or the environmental management programme or any closure plan 
concerned;(c)have appropriate experience in environmental management, prospecting or mining operations and 
mine health and safety matters;(d)have direct access to insurance products and alternative risk financing services 
appropriate to financing of exposure to risks;(e)have the ability to manage trusts set up in terms of section 10 (1) 
(cH) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962); and (f)have expertise and experience or proven access 
thereto to interpret and manage the findings of an environmental risk assessment." 
97 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s28(5)(e) wherein the environment as a whole is the object or res publicae and the 
State holds the legal title with fiduciary responsibility, to the whole environment. 
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placed in the environmental administrative instrument to protect the environment, which 
costs can endure for the lifecycle of the activity and escalate towards the end of life of the 
activity, due to potential decommissioning obligation.98 These are costs which the natural 
resource legislation does not require the operators of industrial facilities to make provision 
for at initiation of the project. 
 
Enforcement instruments in the form of directives and compliance orders intrinsically result 
in a financial liability for operators either in the measures prescribed in the instrument or 
fines for non-compliance.  The 2013 Harmony Gold case99 provided insight on the extent of 
the measures that can be imposed in a directive, affirming that the Minister has the discretion 
to determine the extent of the reasonable measures, should the landholder not be fulfilling 
their obligation100 and that a directive will only come to an end once the reasonable measures 
contained therein have been fulfilled.101  The court however limited the Minister's discretion 
by providing that the measures are limited to the extent that the imposed measures must be 
consistent with the purpose of the NWA and the NEMA principles.102 Translated into 
environmental liability, the fact that the Minister has discretion to impose measures it sees fit 
should be cause for alarm, as once the measures are imposed the debtor  no longer has control 
over the measures it would have otherwise chosen to impose to prevent or remedy the 
pollution. This may lead to significant financial liability for the polluter, as was the case in 
the 2013 Harmony Gold case.103 Moreover, the directive will remain until it has been 
fulfilled, which means that the financial liability will endure even if the entity is sold or 
becomes insolvent.  
 
Similarly, in relation to compliance notices the court in Khabisi NO and Another v Aquarella 
Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd and Others104 found that the wording of s31L(4) of NEMA makes it 
                                                 
98NEMA Act 107 of 1998, GG 38282 , GN983, 4 December 2014, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Regulations - Activity 31, which requires a basic assessment  to be undertaken for 'decommissioning of existing 
facilities , structures or infrastructure  for any developments described in Activity 31, which refers to specific 
facilities , structures or infrastructure in  GN983, GN984, GN 985.  
99 The 2013 Harmony Gold case 2013 JDR 2812 (SCA). 
100The 2013 Harmony Gold case 2013 JDR 2812 (SCA) 23-24. 
101T Humby “The Spectre of Perpetuity Liability for Treating Acid Water on South Africa’s Goldfields: 
Decision in Harmony II” (2013) 31(4) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (JENRL) 461. 
102 2013 JDR 2812 (SCA) at par 25. 
103According to a Business Day ePaper - 31 Jan 2014, "Harmony tells court pollution directive is invalid: as a 
result of the directive "Harmony is paying R1.3m a month to pump water from one of the shafts, a figure 
disproportionate to its contribution to water pollution in the Klerksdorp, Orkney, Stilfontein and Hartbeesfontein 
area". 
104 [2007] 4 All SA 1439 (T) 1448. 
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clear that once a compliance notice is issued, the respondent is obliged by law to comply 
therewith and that s31L(4) is authoritative on the fact that the respondent has no choice but to 
abide by the notice.105 The legislation is once again silent about the cost implications of these 
types of enforcement actions, where the question is again: what if the operator does not have 
the financial means to comply with these conditions? 
 
There are two striking conclusions, which can be reached having considered all of the above 
mentioned environmental liabilities. Firstly, the fact that there is a potential for an amassing 
of cost associated with liabilities and no legislative instrument which ensures that the 
operators of industrial sites can meet these costs and secondly, these costs are associated with 
fulfilling statutory obligations or complying with the enforcement measure and are not 
optional liability costs, leaving them exposed to being unfunded.  With this in mind, chapter 
three will further unpack the challenges with these liabilities and the parties exposed in the 
event of the sale of a business burdened with these liabilities or insolvency. 





3 CHAPTER THREE: CLARIFYING THE CHALLENGES WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES ON INDUSTRIAL SITES 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 The overall challenge  
What has been demonstrated is that currently, there are no express general obligations in 
South African law which compel high risk industries other than mining and petroleum 
industries, to ensure that they have sufficient financial means to cater for their environmental 
liabilities.  
These liabilities are also not always obvious, as the legislation does not identify them as such. 
This could be achieved if the legislation requested a type of financial surety from high risk 
industrial polluters to ensure that the liabilities are addressed.106 If an industry does not have 
the means to attend to its environmental liabilities, this may cause innumerable and 
foreseeable consequences for the State, third parties and certain commercial situations. The 
most significant impact, however, is on the environment.  
The following discussion provides further clarity on the scope of environmental liability and 
the challenge which lies ahead for regulators in managing the complexities of this concept.  It 
will also recognise the parties currently exposed to these liabilities and the commercial 
transactions which are frustrated by the current regulatory cavity. This forms the basis for 
appealing for a regulated solution which will see a type of financial surety put in place for 
high risk industrial manufacturers' environmental liabilities. 
3.2 Scope and Challenges with Environmental Liability 
3.2.1 The Cost of Environmental Liabilities on Industrial Sites  
The cost of cleaning up abandoned mines in South Africa was estimated by the World 
Wildlife Fund ("WWF") in 2012 to be estimated at R30 billion, a cost which may be borne by 
the State and, indirectly, tax payers.107  In the same year the DEA is quoted as estimating the 
remediation costs for a chemical manufacturer accused of prolific mercury contamination of 
                                                 
106 Kruger E, 'Insurance for Environmental Damage: South Africa' (unknown)1. North West University, 
Dissertation. http://dspace.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10394/1628/kruger_erlise.pdf;sequence=1 (Accessed 04 
July 2017). 
107World Wildlife Fund (2012) http://www.wwf.org.za/?6600/acid-mine-draining (Accessed 19 June 2017). See 
Limpitlaw D …et al. Post-Mining Rehabilitation, Land Use and Pollution At Collieries In South Africa; 
Presented at the Colloquium: Sustainable Development in the Life of Coal Mining, Boksburg, (2005) 2.  
30 
 
land and water resources to exceed R100 million.108  If these figures are used as yard sticks 
by which to measure the potential costs of industrial sites' environmental liabilities, the 
polluters involved with these sites are guaranteed to be exposed to comparable, if not similar, 
cost liability. A natural problem when costing environmental liability is the complexity of the 
item that is managed by the environmental obligations, the environment, a mobile and 
unpredictable entity. A starting point, however, is possible by defining "environmental 
damage" as a way to grasp the possible extent of the costs.  
3.2.2 Environmental Damage  
It is necessary to define the term "environmental damage" as this will provide insight into the 
complex nature of activities which are regulated by environmental obligations, which will 
consequently provide perspective on the potential cost of any ensuing environmental liability. 
Damage is synonymous with words such as destruction, harm and injury109 and in the context 
of environmental damage, it is reasonable to construe this to be relative to destruction, harm 
and injury to the environment. Environment is defined in NEMA as - 
"the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of the land, 
water and atmosphere of the earth; micro-organisms, plant and animal life; any 
part or combination of the aforementioned and the interrelationships among and 
between them; and the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and 
conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and well-being”.110 
An environmental impact can therefore be said to be an activity which, in some manner, 
affects the environment as defined above.111 Pollution is one of the most significant kinds of 
environmental impacts causing environmental damage, and is defined as: 
"any change in the environment caused by substances, radioactive or otherwise, or 
noise, odours dust or heat emitted from any activity, including the storage or 
treatment of waste or substances, construction and the provision of services, 
whether engaged in by any person or an organ of state, where that change has an 
adverse effect on human health or well-being or on the composition, resilience 
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and productivity of natural or managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to 
people, or will have such an effect in the future”. 112  
Environmental damage in terms of the above explanations can in the writers view be 
narrowed down to 'an impact resulting in destruction, harm and injury to the land, water and 
atmosphere of the earth; micro-organisms, plant and animal life; any part or combination of 
the aforementioned and the interrelationships among and between them; and the physical, 
chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing and in addition 
influences human health and well-being'.  
Larrson, however, further analyses this term explaining that environmental damage can be 
further distinguished based on113: 
(a) a separation of its source;  
(b) its time perspective; and  
(c) its temporal character.  
The sources, refer to the activity which causes the damage, which in Larrson's view can be 
movable or immovable, dependent on how it impacts.114 An industrial manufacturer is to a 
large extent, an immovable source of environmental damage to the surrounding environment. 
Examples of these sources include accidental spillages of hazardous substances onto land and 
waste deposition to land, causing land and water contamination. 
The time perspective characteristic refers to an attribute of environmental damage which 
makes it difficult to assign environmental debt liability, that being the pollution or impact 
which could have occurred in the past, present or that they may arise in future. 115   
The temporal character refers to the way in which the source of pollution or environmental 
impact causes the environmental damage either intentionally, accidentally (instant), or 
gradually as a result of an old burden.116 
To serve as an illustration of Larrson's explanation, take a figurative 'snapshot in time' of a 
tyre manufacturer's operation, which could be classed as a high risk industry due to its 
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numerous potential lifecycle pollution sources.117 One can say that the onsite environmental 
damage of the manufacturer is: 
(a)  the adverse environmental impacts resultant from an immovable source. The most 
significant adverse environmental impact of a tyre manufacturer is waste production 
and management118 (the actual manufacturing site or an onsite waste site could serve 
as an immovable source of such pollution), with resultant onsite impacts commonly 
being land and water contamination. Land and water contamination by immovable 
sources is in fact a collective concern for most high risk industries; 
(b) the impacts which are present as they could have occurred in the past or present and 
could arise in the future. Pollution of land and water from an industrial manufacturer 
can be a current impact which arose from a past action (i.e illegal or legal dumping) 
and may also have potential future impacts (i.e leaching);and  
(c) the intentional, accidental, gradual or historic acts which caused pollution. This will 
assist a claimant to establish liability for the pollution, with intentional and negligent 
acts punishable in law.    
Larrson's description of environmental damage provides insight into the complexity of what 
is regulated by environmental obligations and the potential cost liability which could burden 
the State and other ignorant parties.  
3.2.3 The Shortfall in Financial Provisioning  
The mining sector has in place a regulatory mechanism which requires rights holders to 
ensure financial provision for remediation and closure activities at the mine.119 Noteworthy is 
the fact that the mining financial provision, however, does not require a holder to provide 
security for fulfilling the mines' ongoing environmental obligations, such as the costs of 
maintaining the mine's environmental license to operate (e.g environmental management 
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programme compliance measures, monitoring and reporting) and various other statutory and 
common law obligations which are in place to regulate pollution of the environment120.  
These costs are usually considered an operational cost, but should a mine find itself in 
financial difficulty with reduced resources to meet its environmental and other financial 
obligations, the environment is undoubtably going to suffer the consequences. As a result, 
holders risk exposure to enforcement actions and the State may be obliged to take its own 
remedial actions.121 The Pamodzi Gold mine fiasco serves as an example of the serious effect 
the reduced financial situation of a polluter can have on the environment whilst the 
commercial solutions are considered.122 
Without any financial provisioning for environmental liabilities the polluter and uninformed 
parties, who may possibly become involved in the management of high risk industrial sites, 
are far more exposed than mines.  
There are voluntary financial provisioning instruments available to industrial sites, such as 
insurance policies. These instruments are however voluntary and these policies have their 
limitations, which includes problems with defining the insurable risk, i.e 'the environment', 
determining the extent of the insurer's liability and the calculation of the correct premium.123 
This does not mean that this type of financial provision is not possible or available. It means 
that polluters would need to voluntarily identify the environmental liability risk, seek out an 
insurer who is willing to assume the liability and understands the risk, and they would most 
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likely be liable for the payment of weighty premiums which may deter them from providing 
for the liability.124 
3.2.4 An Issue of Competence  
The complexity of environmental damage and, as a result the potential environmental liability 
costs seem to be sufficient incentive to ensure that a seller and/or a purchaser are competent 
to manage these liabilities, so as to avoid negligent environmental damage. The legislators of 
the MPRDA had the foresight through regulation to put in place the obligation for holders to 
'transfer environmental liabilities' to purchasers who, under Regulation 59 of the MPRDA 
Regulations, must prove that they have the requisite competence and financial means to 
manage the liabilities identified in any environmental management programme and 
foreclosure plan.125  
A competent person is described in the MPRDA Regulations as a person that must126-  
"(a) have the expertise, resources and organisational abilities to integrate risk 
assessment, risk management and risk financing to ascertain the cost of environmental 
management; 
(b) have the expertise, financial and other resources to meet his or her obligations to 
carry out actions necessary to fulfil the environmental obligations as set out in the 
environmental management plan or the environmental management programme or 
any closure plan concerned; 
(c) have appropriate experience in environmental management, prospecting or mining 
operations and mine health and safety matters; 
(d) have direct access to insurance products and alternative risk financing services 
appropriate to financing of exposure to risks; 
(e)….. 
(f) have expertise and experience or proven access thereto to interpret and manage the 
findings of an environmental risk assessment." 
The MPRDA Regulations raise the bar for the transfer of environmental liabilities, requiring 
all the above ‘perfect’ conditions before these liabilities can be assumed by a purchaser. 
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These regulations commenced in 2004, which illustrates the point that already prior to their 
commencement the State was alive to the cost implications of environmental liabilities and 
the risk this presented to holders, purchasers and probably inadvertently the State.  What is 
noteworthy is that Regulation 59(d) requires purchasers to have direct access to a financial 
provision which is appropriate to financing ''exposure to risk", which, on a reading of 
Regulation 59 in its entirety includes risk exposure for all other environmental liabilities over 
and above remediation and closure of a mine.  
In the Evraz Highveld matter, should the sale between the parties at a minimum be subjected 
to a competency check, this may have prevented the current environmental tragedy. The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs, given the opportunity to interrogate such a transaction, 
may have taken note of Highvelds inability to fund and manage the full extent of the sites 
environmental liability or requested adequate surety from Highveld to cover this liability. In 
the event that Highveld could not meet these criteria, it also would give the Minister an 
opportunity to recommend that the sale should not proceed on the basis that the liability will 
become the States, as is the current situation.  
3.3 Affected Parties -The Polluter, the State and Liquidators 
3.3.1 The Polluter  
The ‘polluter pays principle’ was first defined in a discussion document written by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1974127 ("OECD"). In the 
discussion document, the environmental committee of the OECD explained that the principle 
is founded on the concept that the cost of pollution prevention and control measures must be 
allocated in such a manner that it encourages rational use of scarce environmental resources 
and avoids distortion in international trade and investment128. With this in mind, the 
committee ring-fenced the principle as a “fundamental principle of cost allocation”.129 The 
definition of the principle in the discussion document is also telling with regards to its 
intended cost allocation purpose, with the document defining the principle by explaining that-  
 
“… the polluter should bear the expenses of preventing and controlling pollution to 
ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state”130….  
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The committee also made recommendations on how the policy is to be adopted, suggesting 
process and production standards and/or individual regulation and prohibition and/or direct 
national regulation131. In summary, the principle as it stands in the OECD document was 
designed to put in place a mechanism for making polluters responsible for the costs of 
preventing and putting in place control measures, but not considered a legal principle which 
could be used for allocating liability to a party for the consequences of pollution -  i.e a 
compensatory principle.132 As a compensatory principle one would be looking at claiming 
from the polluter, the cost incurred by a claimant and the cost to the environment itself for 
environmental harm. 
 
The White Paper on Environmental Policy in South Africa (“the White Paper 1998”) did 
exactly this, stating that the implementation of this principle in South Africa means that 133  –  
 
"those responsible for environmental damage must pay the repair costs both to the 
environment and human health, and the costs of preventive measures to reduce or 
prevent further pollution and environmental damage".  
 
As a result of this, the 'polluter pays principle' has been implemented as a preventative and 
compensatory principle in environmental management regulation in South Africa, a dynamic 
concept which provides the basis for assigning cost for environmental liability. The principle 
may however be unusable when trying to use it to for matters involving historic pollution, 
where polluters have long since disappeared.134  The 'polluter pays principle' provides the 
basis for labelling industrial manufacturers like Highveld and Exxaro's Zincor as 'polluters' 
and therefore liable for the costs associated with environmental liabilities. 
 
3.3.2 The State as a trustee  
The notion of 'public trusteeship' of the State over certain natural resources is not a 
commonly exploited concept, which is surprising considering the potential authority and 
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burden this concept places on the State in respect of the trust object. International supporters 
of the public trust doctrine claim that s24 of the Constitution laid the foundation for 
numerous of our environmental statutes to incorporate the public trust doctrine.135 This 
doctrine is accepted as “a legal obligation placed on the State to hold certain natural resources 
in trust for its people and creates a custodial duty on the State to protect and preserve the 
resource for present and future generations”.136   
 
The environmental right under s24 of the Constitution is in the same category as a 
‘fundamental human right’ and s24(b) directs the State to-  
 
"take reasonable legislative and other measures to prevent pollution, promote 
conservation and secure ecological sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development".  
 
Feris demonstrates that this burden can be shared with the extension of the understood 
application of s24(a) of the Constitution.137 Traditionally s24(a) is a ‘horizontally applied 
principle, guaranteeing the right to an environment that is not harmful to human health or 
well-being and to environmental protection for the benefit of present and future generations. 
When enforced, this translates into an obligation for the legislature, executive and judiciary 
and all State organs to take steps to guarantee this right for the benefit of "every person". 
However, a reading of s8(2) of the Constitution extends the application of rights in the Bill of 
Rights to bind natural and juristic persons, meaning that private individuals also carry this 
obligation. In Feris's view, this means that private actors can also be required to shoulder 
some of the environmental liability which may arise out of custodial duties.138 
  
The White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa ("the White Paper 1997") 
explains that the doctrine of public trust descends from the Roman law principle of public 
trust139, a doctrine which arises from the Roman seed of jus publicum.140 This notion 
prescribes that certain resources are of such a common nature that they defy private 
ownership, and as such should be managed for public benefit. Internationally, this principle 
                                                 
135 E Van Der Schyff and G Viljoen “Water and the Public Trust Doctrine- A South African Perspective” (2008) 
4(2) The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 379. 
136 Feris (note 134); E Van Der Schyff, "Stewardship Doctrine of Public Trust: Has The Eagle of Public Trust 
Landed on South African Soil?" (2013) 130 (2) South African Law Journal (SALJ)373. 




evolved in water law as a way to protect public rights of access to navigable waterways and, 
it then went on to develop conservationist principles.141 It then slowly became recognised as a 
custodial duty placed on State governments to manage and protect certain natural resources 
for the sole intergenerational benefit of their citizens.142  
 
The doctrine enacted into our natural resources law appears in s2 of NEMA, which  states 
that the 'environment is held in trust for people' and the State is appointed as the custodian 
thereof, which is implied seeing that the State is the elected representative of the 
public.143This notion is reinforced by s28(5) of NEMA which provides that the competent 
authority must regard "the desirability of the State fulfilling its role as custodian holding the 
environment in public trust  for the people", when considering reasonable measures to 
enforce upon a defendant under this section. The State in NEMA is represented by the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs as an agent of the State.144 In the preamble of the NWA, it 
is stated that water is a natural resource that belongs to all people, and s3 states that the 
national government, acting through the Minister of Water Affairs is the public trustee of the 
nation's water resources and that – 
 
“the Minister must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved,  
managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of 
all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate”.  
 
To be a public trustee of water resources, as described above means that the State holds the 
legal title to the water resources as the trust object and can only manage the resource insofar 
as the fiduciary responsibilities and obligations in the NWA allow.145The obligations of the 
public trustee are onerous under the NWA, requiring the State to take ultimate responsibility 
over water resource as a resource of res publicae, with use and allocation required to be in the 
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interest of all citizens146. The Minister is authorised to delegate this mandate to provincial and 
local government and create water management institutions to assist government to 
implement its mandate147. Jointly, these government authorities can be referred to as the 
trustees of the nation’s water resources.  
 
The use of the words trust, trustee and custodian in the legislation denotes a fiduciary 
responsibility on the Ministers to deal with natural resources in the public interest or in the 
interest of the South African nation.148 The beneficiaries are therefore not distinct persons, 
but the public at large, and the trust object is protected in the public interest.149  According to 
the White Paper 1997, government's custodial duties to protect the environment for the 
benefit of current and future generations includes the duties to150- 
 ensure that environmental resources are beneficially used in the public interest; 
 protect the people's common heritage; 
 ensure the public's reasonable access to the environment and natural resources; 
 ensure adherence by all spheres of government to the public trust; and 
 promote and fulfil the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism's leading 
role in implementing government's custodianship of the environment. 
 
The result of the doctrine is that it has the potential to create a public right for citizens (‘the 
beneficiaries’) to demand the realisation and protection of their interests  in the environment 
as individuals, and gives the custodian ‘legal standing’ to take action against historic and 
current polluters.151 The courts have, on numerous occasions, confirmed the State’s role as 
custodian in respect of natural resources152, and ultimately this confirmation may result in a 
cost liability for the State as a trustee can be required by beneficiaries  to ‘fit the bill’ in the 
event that the trust object is damaged or harm is sustained by a beneficiary.153   
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The State and the respective Ministers are therefore also exposed in the event that an 
industrial polluter relinquishes their obligation to address the environmental liabilities caused 
by their operation. 
3.3.3 Liquidators  
A liquidator's primary duty is to take possession of all movable and immovable property of a 
company, then to realise the property in the prescribed manner and to apply the proceeds 
towards payment of the costs of winding up, satisfy the claims of the creditors and to 
distribute the balance among the members.154 The liquidator of a company also stands in a 
"fiduciary relationship" to the company, to the body of its members and creditors as a whole, 
which relationship requires it to act in good faith.155  
 
Should the company, prior to the insolvency, be issued with a compliance order from the 
competent authority to clean up, remediate or pay a putative penalty156, the liquidator is 
obliged as a result of this 'fiduciary relationship' to act in good faith in respect of this order as 
with any other compliance orders.157 The same would ring true for all the other 
environmental obligations placed on the insolvent.158 In the event that the liquidator does not 
comply with this order, the liquidator may be held criminally liable for failing to comply with 
the order, as s49(1)(e) and (f)  of NEMA provide that a person is guilty of an offence if they – 
 
"(e) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or omission which 
causes significant pollution or degradation of the environment or is likely to cause 
significant pollution or degradation of the environment; 
( f ) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or omission which 
detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect the environment." 
 
Criminal liability may include the imposition of a fine or imprisonment.159 A liquidator may 
also be exposed to liability if the State160 elects to take steps to fulfil the obligations in the 
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compliance order due to inaction of the liquidator, as is authorised by s28(7) of NEMA.  In 
this case the State may, in terms of s28(8) of NEMA recover costs for the reasonable 
remedial measures from: 
 
 "(a) any person who is or was responsible for, or who directly or indirectly 
contributed to, the pollution or degradation or the potential pollution or degradation; 
             (d) any person who negligently failed to prevent— 
(i) the activity or the process being performed or undertaken; or 
(ii)  the situation from coming about; 
Provided that such person failed to take the measures required of him or her under 
subsection (1)." 
 
Furthermore, a liquidator that fails to take the measures required of him in terms of the order 
and s28(1) of NEMA, which contains an environmental obligation to fulfil a 'duty of care' to 
the environment, will be exposed jointly and severally to this environmental debt liability 
along with any other parties that benefited from the State's actions.161 
3.4 The impact on commercial dealings 
3.4.1 A purchaser and seller  
Stilton advises that there are two basic structures for buying and selling a business, a sale and 
purchase of some or all of the assets (with all or only some of the liabilities) or a sale and 
purchase of the shares in a company.162 In the first structure, a purchaser will buy all the 
agreed assets of the business and ownership of each will pass to the purchaser. Whereas, in a 
share sale, the assets and liabilities of the business will continue to belong to the business, 
with ownership only changing in respect of the shares.163    
 
Purchasers often expose themselves to hidden liabilities in the target company's assets as a 
result of the target's past and present operating practices.164 These liabilities can manifest in 
the form of contaminated land or operational equipment which does not meet compliance 
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standards.165 However, an asset sale can be beneficial for a purchaser as it allows the 
purchaser, through a due diligence assessment, to assess all liabilities. It is, however, evident 
that 'environmental audits' do not play a big role in due diligence examinations in South 
Africa.166 This can possibly be attributed to the fact that South Africa is an emerging market 
economy, and due to the fact that there is a lack of clear legislative regulation for these 
liabilities.167  Should a purchaser then default on these liabilities it is likely that a third party 
may pursue the seller, who will then rely on the contractual indemnities provided by the 
purchaser, which may be of no value if the purchaser is in financial difficulty.168  
 
This scenario highlights four potential outcomes when considering environmental liabilities, 
namely the purchaser's ignorance regarding the extent of the liabilities it may be assuming, 
the purchaser's default on these liabilities as a result of financial constraints, the seller being 
called upon to address the liabilities by third parties and when either party defaults169, the 
State as trustee risks being summonsed.  This is more often than not the situation that will 
arise where a purchaser needs to claim for these liabilities after the fact. Although an asset 
sale allows the purchaser to identify all the liabilities and to negotiate these with the seller, 
our legislation does not identify, nor mandate a financial provision to be held for all potential 
environmental liabilities associated with high risk industrial sites, thus leaving the purchaser 
and third parties exposed. 
 
A share sale transaction creates a far greater risk for a purchaser, as all that is necessary for 
the purchaser to assume all the liabilities of the target company is for a formal transfer of the 
target company's shares.170 The purchaser in a share sale transaction is liable to take on the 
liability for any breaches of law committed by the seller171, which may cost the purchaser 
more than the value of the shares in the long run, especially since it is likely that the seller 
indemnified itself against such liabilities as part of the transaction terms.  
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As has been illustrated, the seller and purchaser of a business are similarly exposed to the risk 
of environmental liabilities costs. 
3.4.2 Due diligence, indemnities and warranties in sales  
The rationale for undertaking a due diligence exercise, requesting indemnities and warranties 
in corporate sales is broadly to protect either party from assuming unidentified liabilities and 
to limit the respective parties' liability in respect of identified liabilities.172 Environmental 
audit due diligence is a valuable tool in that it identifies environmental issues at an early stage 
of the transaction allowing the purchaser to estimate the cost hereof; it reveals how the target 
company managed its liabilities and it has the potential to highlight future liability 
concerns.173   
The disadvantage is that these audits are voluntary and only as valuable as the professionals 
responsible for the assessment.  Whilst it is true that a purchaser would not blindly purchase a 
risky target company, without first attempting to understand its exposure, it is also true that 
due to the voluntary nature of these audits there are no regulatory requirement to undertake 
them. There is furthermore, no legislated professional criteria for auditors other than what is 
recommended by academic literature and the International Standards Organisations (ISO).174  
As a result of the fallibility of these audits, environmental liabilities which are unidentified or 
underfunded may pass between the parties.  
Warranties and indemnities then provided by a seller are also not a sure security for such 
liabilities, as these often only last a few years  as a result of the contract between the parties 
and are limited by amounts and timing, which make the enforcement of them time consuming 
and costly whilst the environmental damage continues.175  
3.4.3 Winding up a business  
The scenario of insolvency represents various challenges for environmental liability. This is 
mainly due to the fact that environmental liability and insolvency are concepts which seem to 
be continuums apart. A closer look, however, reveals that environmental liability should play 
a more significant role in insolvency practice on industrial sites. These challenges are 
separated for ease of understanding. 
                                                 
172 Sampson (52:33) Par 3.3. 
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174 Sampson (52:33) Par 3.2 and 3.7. See ISO 14015 Environmental Assessments of Sites and Organisations; 
Gillman (168:76). 
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3.4.3.1 Administrative costs of environmental liabilities  
Theoretically, during the process of administration the liquidator would need to manage all 
the debtor's environmental obligations progressing to remediation and closure of the site.  
These obligations include the debtor's statutory and administrative obligations, which can be 
identified in insolvency terms as obligations which are administrative in nature and, therefore 
they are not stayed when insolvency of the debtor is ordered. An example of the statutory 
obligation which the liquidator would need to comply with would be the duty of care 
obligation, which requires the debtor to neutralise the sites current and future pollution 
potential.176According to Stander, these costs would form part of the administrative costs of 
the liquidation being paid out of the proceeds of the liquidation before the claims of any 
creditors, as would any other compliance obligation of the debtor.177  However, due to the 
potential cost it is unlikely that the liquidator will be able to meet the obligations, which will 
leave the environment exposed and the State responsible.178 
Stander recognises that the potential cost of remediation of land associated with an industrial 
site may form a significant part of the environmental liability costs. It is suggested that the 
liquidator establish a reserve or be allowed to abandon the property, rendering it bona 
vacantia, allowing it to accrue to the State.179This ultimately becomes a liability for the 
public due to risk exposure and financial implications. 
The establishment of a reserve for environmental damage and awarding preference in 
insolvency proceedings is, according to Stander, based on the proposal that this should only 
be for the "necessary cost…where environmental conditions present immediate, imminent 
and identifiable harms".180 
Considering the Hichange case, what is 'significant' is a subjective matter and measured 
against the environmental right in the Constitution regarding "immediate, imminent and 
identifiable harms,"181 which may be most if not all of the environmental damage on a high 
risk industrial site.  
                                                 
176 Stander (158: 437 and 442). 
177 Stander (158:438). 
178 It is acknowledged that the directors or the debtor may be held personally liable in terms of s24N(8) of 
NEMA  for funding of these liabilities, however in the absence of the State taking enforcement measures against 
the directors the environment and the State are exposed.  
179 Stander (158:441). 
180 Stander (158:443). 
181 Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd T/A Pelts Products, And Others 2004 (2) SA 
393 (E) 415. 
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3.4.3.2 Environmental Damage and Priority of claims  
A claim for damages or harm to the environment lodged before liquidation as a result of the 
debtor's activities is a concurrent claim.182 Correspondingly, a claim for environmental 
damages which arises after liquidation as a result of activities prior, or even after, the 
liquidation will also be a concurrent claim.183  If the State or a third party undertook the 
remediation of the site as fulfilment of the debtor's obligations, they would similarly only 
have a concurrent claim.184 This does not seem reasonable considering the fact that the 
preferred creditors may in fact benefit from the remediation or fulfilment of the 
manufacturer's environmental obligations. 
The extent of the environmental liabilities and potential risk exposure of third parties 
described in Chapter Three, should be incentive enough for legislators to consider legislating 
statutory solutions, which sees the implementation of a 'security system' for high risk 
industrial sites. These challenges are however, not unique to South Africa, as it is not the only 
country with high risk industrial sites. Chapter four will discuss perspective on these 
challenges and solutions that can be found in the international context with certain countries 
in Europe, supporting high risk industrial activities and manufacturing for over two centuries. 
                                                 






4 CHAPTER FOUR: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IRELANDS APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 The European Union  
The 'polluter pays principle' is one of the key environmental principles of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"), which at Article 174 (2) states that 185–  
"Union policy on the environment…shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the 
polluter should pay." 
The White Paper on Environmental Liability ("Environmental Liability White Paper") was 
adopted by the European Commission in February 2000 with the aim of exploring how "the 
polluter pays principle" can best serve the aims of community environmental policy. This 
entails that the Environmental Liability White Paper explores how community regimes on 
environmental liability can best be shaped to improve the application of the principle and to 
ensure restoration of damage to the environment.186   
The Environmental Liability White Paper recognises the 'polluter pays principle' as the single 
environmental management principle, which can provide a solution to the concern of the 
State and taxpayer becoming liable for environmental damage, and as a way to improve 
compliance within the respective community regimes.187 This recognition is founded on the 
fact that the principle in its pure form requires prevention first and then internalisation of 
environmental costs by the polluter.188 The Environmental Liability White Paper therefore 
promotes the idea that community regimes should adopt a system of liability (legal 
responsibility, obligation and charges) for environmental damage. The emphasis here, being 
an environmental liability regime which is focused on the environment and all the damages 
                                                 
185 TFEU, art. [174], 2008 O.J. C. 115, at [2]. 
186White Paper on Environmental Liability COM(2000) 66 Final 9 February 2000(1). Commission adopts White 
Paper on Environmental Liability , EU Commission Press Release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-
137_en.htm (Accessed 01 February 2017). 
187 White Paper on Environmental Liability COM(2000) 66 Final 9 February 2000(3)14. 
188 The Polluter Pays Principle Definition, Analysis, Implementation , Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). Environment Directorate. France. (1975)12. 
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caused by activities that are known to be hazardous to the environment.189 The Member 
States, similar to the South African position, had in place existing environmental legislation 
which dealt with issues of strict liability for damage and general obligations in respect of the 
environment, but did not have a regime which dealt consistently with all damages caused by 
activities that are known to be hazardous to the environment.190  
Some salient features which the Environmental Liability White Paper proposes that should be 
included in such a regime, include:  
 the covering of environmental damage specifically and not only in the traditional 
sense which includes claims for personal injury or damage to property. This can be 
achieved by isolating specific environmental media or impacts such as biodiversity or 
contaminated land;191 
 catering specifically for activities which bear an inherent risk for causing damage and 
merging these existing legislative obligations;192 
 the principle of strict liability for environmental damage;193 
 ensuring that specific persons are indicated as liable for activities;194and 
 establishing criteria for different types of damage to environmental aspects and 
impacts, taking into consideration the objectives of environmental media and impacts, 
which could include conservation and/or restoration.195  
Moreover, the Environmental Liability White Paper emphasises that any regime on 
environmental liability must be founded upon the core of "workable financial security 
systems". These systems are there to ensure that the goals of a financial liability regime are 
met and that polluters are able to meet their liabilities in the event that they are called to do so 
by the authorities.196 The paper acknowledges that this system's effectiveness is linked wholly 
to techniques used to quantify environmental damage, and that "developing qualitative and 
reliable quantitative criteria for recognition and measurement of environmental damage will 
                                                 
189 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178:14). 
190 Ibid 
191 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178:16). 
192 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178: 17). 
193 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178:18). Strict liability in the environmental liability regime is 
liability which is imputed onto an actor without the plaintiff having to prove fault by the actor in causing the 
environmental damage.  
194 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178: 19). 
195 Ibid 
196 White Paper on Environmental Liability (178:15). 
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advance the financial security available for the liability regime".197 Financial security options 
promoted by the paper include insurance, guarantees, internal reserves or sector wise pooling 
systems.198 
Environmental impairment liability insurance is described as security where a third party ('the 
insurer') undertakes to compensate the licensee for environmental damages.199 Bank 
guarantees or guarantees in general also involve third parties, either the bank or a parent 
company providing surety in the name of a beneficiary which is not the licensee. The 
beneficiary could be the State or a specific authority, who can call on the guarantee should it 
be faced with remediating the environmental damage.200 Internal reserves refers to a secured 
fund or trust held by the licenses, with a "first ranking fixed charge in favour" of the State.201 
The trust is set up in such a way that should the licensee fail to meet its obligations, the trust 
event is triggered and the State can then access the trust funds.202   
Sector wise pooling has been described as "special compensation funds for damage caused by 
industries posing a particular risk of damage".203 The intention of such a fund is to provide a 
supplement form of compensation in the event that the polluter cannot, for whatever reason, 
afford to remediate their environmental damage. An excellent example of such a system is 
the US Superfund, which fund is funded by taxes placed on crude oil, chemical feedstock 
industries and general environmental corporate tax.204 The fund empowers the US 
Environmental Protection Agency to respond to environmental incidents or remediation of 
sites. The civil liability system is then used to recover costs from responsible parties.205 
4.2 Ireland and Environmental Liabilities  
To give life to the intentions of the Environmental Liability White Paper, the Directive on 
Environmental Liability  was passed by the European Parliament in 2004 ("the EL 
Directive").206 The EL Directive was transposed into Irish Law through the European 
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Communities' Environmental Liabilities Regulations 2008 ("ECEL Regulations")207, the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention Directive ("IPPC")208, the Industrial Emission Directive 
("IED")209, the Waste Framework Directive ("WFD")210, the Landfill Directive211 and the 
Mining Waste Directive212. Jointly, these form the basis for Ireland's regulation of 
environmental liabilities.  
At the initiation of the process of Irelands regulation of environmental liabilities, Ireland, 
(similar to what may be experienced by South Africa should it transition its environmental 
liability regime) had legislation which varied with the ECEL Regulations, the IPPC and 
IED.213 To manage the integration, the Irish Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 
published numerous guideline documents on how the concepts in the Environmental Liability 
White Paper and EL Directive214 could be assimilated into Irish law. Currently, Irish law only 
requires holders of landfill authorisations and mining permissions to have in place financial 
security for the full cost of responding and remediating when incidents occur and for 
management, decommissioning, closure and aftercare.215 Already, this shows that Ireland has 
a more advanced environmental liability regime.  
The discussion will underline the most significant aspects of these guidelines and Irish law 
insofar as it may assist South Africa with taking steps towards regulating high risk industrial 
sites and overall environmental liabilities in a holistic fashion. 
4.2.1 Guidance on Environmental Liability, Risk Assessment, Residual Management 
Plans and Financial Provision 
This 2006 Irish EPA ("2006 guide") guideline proposes that environmental liabilities can be 
subdivided into two main types, namely known and unknown liabilities, with the 
quantification and costing of these liabilities conducted separately, making use of different 
                                                 
207 S.I NO 547/2008. See http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2008/si/547/made/en/pdf (Accessed 1 February 
2017).  





213Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Guidance on Environmental Liability, Risk Assessment, Residual 
Management Plans and Financial Provision (2006)1. 
214 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Guidance on Environmental Liability, Risk Assessment, Residual 
Management Plans and Financial Provision (2006); Guidance on Assessment and Costing Environmental 
Liabilities (2014); Guidance on Financial Provision for Environmental Liabilities (2015). 
215EPA, Guidance on Assessment and Costing Environmental Liabilities (2014)4; Guidance on Financial 
Provision for Environmental Liabilities (191:1). 
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financial instruments.216 The 2006 guide identifies these liabilities by the environmental 
damage perpetrated by the polluter, whereas South African national legislation identifies 
these liabilities by importing obligations onto a polluter. Therefore, our legislation assumes 
that the polluter is aware of these liabilities through its obligations. The known liabilities are 
defined by the EPA as "planned, anticipated liabilities associated with facility closure, 
restoration and aftercare and management", and unknown liabilities identified as "the risk of 
environmental liabilities occurring due to unexpected events".217   
The EPA's proposes a systematic stepwise approach to managing these liabilities. The EPA 
considers the type of facility, the duration and extent of the restoration and aftercare 
management and the potential risk of unknown liabilities to determine the level of assessment 
and financial provisions required.218 The steps proposed include: 
i. Step 1: Initial Screening and Operational Risk Assessment 
ii. Step 2: Preparation of a Closure, Restoration and Aftercare Management Plan 
("CRAMP") for known Liabilities. 
iii. Step 3: Environmental Liability Risk Assessment ("ELRA") for unknown Liabilities; 
and 
iv. Step 4: Identification of Financial Provision ("FP") and Instruments 
This systematic stepwise approach has been drafted by the EPA into certain legislative 
instruments which regulate high risk activities, some of which require the EPA to encapsulate 
these steps as pre-conditions into licenses.  
4.2.2 Guidance on Assessing and Costing Environmental Liabilities 
The 2014 Irish EPA guideline ("2014 Guide") presents a systematic approach to assessing 
and costing environmental liabilities associated with closure, restoration, aftercare and 
incidents, which may occur from activities falling under the EPA authorisation regimes.219  
What is significant here is the fact that the 2014 Guide indirectly acknowledged that there is a 
cost not only associated with closure of these authorised facilities, but also linked to their 
aftercare or possible incidents which may occur during their operation. The 2014 Guide 
explains that the "overall purpose of closure and restoration should be to ensure that the 
                                                 
216Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Guidance on Environmental Liability, Risk Assessment, Residual 
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necessary measures are taken to avoid any risk of environmental pollution and where this has 
occurred to return the site to a satisfactory state".220  According to the 2014 Guideline, 
operators that cause significant pollution of soil and groundwater must, at closure, return the 
environment to baseline conditions, which should be the benchmark unless the operator and 
the authority provide for an alternative.221 
The level of scoping assessment described in the 2014 guide is driven by the nature of the 
activity and its associated risks. Therefore operations with significant soil and groundwater 
pollution potential require a closure and restorative care plan, whereas those with minor 
pollution potential may only require a closure plan. All authorised operators are however 
required to assess and cost for incident management as part of their combined financial 
provisioning.222 
4.2.3 Guidance on Financial Provision for Environmental Liabilities  
The 2015 Irish EPA guideline ("2015 guide"), prioritises three principles for financial 
provisions, noting that they should be secure, sufficient and available when required. 223 
The 2015 guideline defines these principles stating that 'secure' means that the provision must 
be in place for the duration of the licensee’s obligations, which includes possible insolvency 
of the licensee224. 'Sufficient' means that there must be enough of the provision to meet all the 
licensee's obligations and adequate to cover the cost of closure and environmental liability 
risk, 'available' means, the provision must be accessible to the authority or licensee when 
required to discharge the licensee's obligations at the relevant time.225 
The financial provision instruments describe in the 2015 guide and catered for in the Irish law 
include secured funds226, on demand performance bonds227, parent company guarantees228, 
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charge on property229 and insurance230. This indicates that the Irish legal system recognises 
the need for dynamic financial provision instruments to cater for different types of 
environmental liability concerns. As an example, insurance would not be an appropriate 
financial provision for closure liability, as this is a known liability.  
The following is an example from the Irish natural resource legislation regulating waste and 
illustrates how the EPA has provided for this approach. 
4.2.3.1 The Waste Management Act, 1996 ("the WMA")231 
The WMA prohibits the EPA from granting or transferring232 a waste management license 
until it is satisfied of certain matters which include, the agency satisfying itself that the 
applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a waste management license233 and that the 
applicant has complied with the requirements for provision of financial security.234 
The fitness of the license holder and transferee of a respective license is determined on a 
similar basis as described in Regulation 58 and 59 of the MPRDA, which Regulations also 
require the authority to determine whether the holder is in a financial position to meet any 
financial commitments or liabilities.235 The EPA however does not limit these costs to a 
specific plan, but requires the applicants to make use of guideline and regulations which will 
assist them in satisfying the EPA that they can meet these commitments financially.  The 
WMA, in  s40(7), provides that - 
"(7) For the purpose of this Part, a person shall be regarded as a fit and proper person 
if …(c) in the opinion of the Agency, that person is likely to be in a position to meet 
any financial commitments or liabilities that the Agency reasonably considers will be 
entered into or incurred by him or her in carrying on the activity to which the waste 
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licence will relate in accordance with the terms thereof or in consequence of ceasing 
to carry on that activity." 
This requirement, if integrated into South Africa's national resource law, will address the 
competency and financial security challenge identified on transfer of licenses in the sale of a 
business. 
In order to satisfy the EPA that the applicant has complied with the requirements for 
provision of financial security, the EPA proposes two measures which include regulatory 
compliance and inclusion of certain conditions into the holder's license. The regulatory 
requirement under the WMA are contained in s53(b)(i) and (ii), which states that-  
"(1) The Agency may, before it does any of the following things, namely-. 
(a) decides whether to— (i) grant a waste licence…require the applicant for, or the 
holder of, the licence or the proposed transferee, as the case may be, to— 
(i) furnish to it such particulars in respect of such matters affecting his or her ability to 
meet the financial commitments or liabilities that the Agency reasonably considers 
will be entered into or incurred by him or her in carrying on the activity to which the 
licence relates or will relate, as the case may be, in accordance with the terms of the 
licence or in consequence of ceasing to carry on that activity as it may specify, and 
(ii) make, and furnish evidence of having so made, such financial provision as it may 
specify (which may include the entering into a bond or other form of security) as will, 
in the opinion of the Agency, be adequate to discharge the said financial commitments 
or liabilities." 
The regulatory compliance, similar to that imposed under the MPRDA, prohibits the EPA 
from granting a license without the applicant proving and furnishing proof thereof to the EPA 
of their ability to meet their financial obligations with respect to environmental liabilities.236  
Significantly, this requirement for financial provision contemplates the inclusion of costs 
associated with environmental administrative requirements (fulfilling the terms of the license) 
as well as ceasing the activity, which cessation could include unplanned or planned cessation. 
The EPA guideline provides examples of license conditions which are included in applicant's 
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integrated pollution prevention licenses, which conditions include post authorisation financial 
provisioning to cater for the EPA's systematic approach to assessment and management of 
environmental liabilities.237  Concepts such as residual management, which in the guideline 
forms part of the step two assessment requirements and step three Environmental Liabilities 
Risk Assessment ("ERLA") for unknown liabilities, are included in conditions of licenses 
awarded by the EPA. Examples of conditions as described in the EPA's systematic approach, 
include: 
"(a) Residual Management 
14.1 Following termination, or planned cessation for a period greater than six months, 
of use or involvement of all or part of the site in the licensed activity, the licensee 
shall, to the satisfaction of the Agency, decommission, render safe or remove for 
disposal/recovery, any soil, subsoils, buildings, plant or equipment, or any waste, 
materials or substances or other matter contained therein or thereon, that may result in 
environmental pollution. 
14.2.1 The licensee shall prepare, to the satisfaction of the Agency, a fully detailed 
and costed plan for the decommissioning or closure of the site or part thereof. This 
plan shall be submitted to the Agency for agreement within six months of the date of 
commencement of the activities at the site. 
14.2.2 The plan shall be reviewed annually … 
14.3 The Residuals Management Plan shall include as a minimum, the following: 
14.3.2 The criteria which define the successful decommissioning of the activity or 
part thereof, which ensures minimum impact to the environment. 
14.3.3 A programme to achieve the stated criteria.. 
14.3.5 Details of costings for the plan and a statement as to how these costs will be 
underwritten." 
This license condition caters for the risk of residual management of a waste facility, in the 
event of planned or unplanned closure, requesting the holder to submit a costed and 
                                                 




underwritten plan, which will render the site neutralised from an environmental pollution 
potential. Theoretically, this plan, if costed and funded appropriately, would address 
environmental liabilities associated with closure of a facility and address the funding gap, 
which may impact upon polluters, purchasers and liquidators.  A further example of a 
conditions as described in the EPA's systematic approach: 
"(b) Financial Provisions 
15.3.1 The licensee shall arrange for the completion, by an independent and 
appropriately qualified consultant, of a comprehensive and fully costed 
Environmental Liabilities Risk Assessment for the operation, which will address 
liabilities from past and present activities. A report on this assessment to be submitted 
to the Agency for agreement within six months of date of commencement of either or 
both of the activities at the site.  
15.3.2 Within nine months of the date of commencement of either or both of the 
activities at the site the licensee shall make financial provision in a form acceptable to 
the Agency to cover any liabilities incurred by the licensee. The amount of indemnity 
must always be capable of covering the liabilities identified in Condition 15.3.1. 
15.3.3 The amount of indemnity, held under Condition 15.3.2 shall be reviewed and 
revised as necessary, but at least annually. 
15.3.4 The licensee shall within two weeks of purchase, renewal or revision of the 
financial indemnity required under Condition 15.3.2, forward to the Agency written 
proof of such indemnity." 
An ERLA in the context of this condition requires holders to assess a past and present 
liability which extends on the description provided in the guideline, requiring applicants to 
only assess 'unplanned events'. This would require holders to assess past and future activities 
on the site which would lead to unplanned events which would result in environmental 
liability. The guideline provides details on what the EPA requires in respect of this risk 
assessment and appropriate costing for these liabilities.   
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Significantly, this condition requires the holder to cost for this liability and to annually 
provide for the liability in an appropriate provision. Due to the fact that these are unknown 
liabilities, risk transfer instruments such as bonds and insurance are recommended.238 
The illustrated regulations and conditions do not detail how an applicant should specifically 
apply the described systematic stepwise approach. It is understood that this approach is 
adopted by applicants as a part of 'best practice' when applicants are challenged with 
regulations and conditions as described. What is valuable about these provisions is that they 
illustrate how, by regulation and obligatory license conditions, all environmental obligations 
which arise at all stages of an activity can be secured by means of financial security. In 
Chapter five, recommendations will be provided as to how an environmental liability regime 
for high risk industrial sites can be introduced into South Africa, utilising existing statutory 
tools and proposing certain amendments to these tools, as a result of the findings in the 
international context.  
 
                                                 





5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 South Africa's Natural Resource Law and the White Paper on Environmental 
Liability  
The South African natural resources regulatory framework for environmental obligations has 
some redeeming features which resonate with the suggested environmental liability regime 
features in the Environmental Liability White Paper. The environmental duty under s28 of 
NEMA caters for environmental damage specifically, associating liability to specific persons 
for this damage.239 With NEMA being framework legislation the specific environmental 
management acts can reference this general duty and authorities may utilise the liability 
regime created herein as a fit for purpose for specific environmental media claims.240 The 
principle of strict liability is also alive in s28, as the authority is able to issue a directive on 
the basis of the identified person not taking reasonable measures to prevent, mitigate or 
manage significant environmental pollution.241 The authority is not required to prove that the 
person is at fault before issuance of the directive.242 
The NEMWA contaminated land provisions are also a progressive example of a growing 
environmental liability regime, and include features which specifically establish a criteria for 
remediation of contaminated land.243 The mining and petroleum sectors and their governing 
legislation are also examples of the integration of environmental liability with financial 
security systems into specific high risk activities, illustrating that this can be achieved. 
However, as has been exemplified in the scope of challenges with environmental liabilities, 
the South African legislators have omitted to integrate many of these features in a consistent 
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Act, 1989 (Act No. 73 of 1989);(b)the National Water Act, 1998 (Act No. 36 of 1998);(c) the National 
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manner, across all possible affected environmental media and specific high risk activities, 
such as those undertaken by industrial manufacturers.  
The challenge with simply proposing that the legislators introduce a financial surety 
provision for industrial sites is that not all industries have the potential to create the same 
level of risk, and therefore a 'one size fits all' approach will not be appropriate. A more 
systematic approach, as catered for in Irish Law is recommended whereby the industrial sites 
are subjected to risk assessments, which guide the authority as to the potential environmental 
liability exposure which can emanate from the facility. The risk profile of the facility then 
determines the appropriate financial surety. As in the mining industry, this risk assessment 
should be a complementary tool to the already available set of impact assessment tools 
described in the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations of NEMA244, such as the 
basic assessment process245, the scoping and environmental impact assessment process246, 
specialist reports247 and environmental audit reports.248 
5.2 Steps towards a Holistic Environmental Liability Regime for South African 
Due to the complexities involved in understanding and catering for environmental liabilities, 
it is recommended that legislators consider a series of statutory amendments and enactments 
to the framework legislation, which can include the formulating of environmental liability 
guidelines which can be published in terms of s24J of NEMA. 
5.2.1 Defining Environmental Damage, Environmental Liabilities and Financial 
Provisions 
It has been illustrated that environmental damage leads to environmental liabilities, which 
have cost implications for an operator. NEMA does not contain a conclusive definition of 
'environmental damage' which can be utilised when considering environmental liabilities. 
Environmental damage must be distinguished from environmental impacts as not all impacts 
cause damage to the environment, thus creating liability.249  The definition of 'environmental 
                                                 
244 NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, GNR.982, 4 December 
2014 (Government Gazette No. 38282). Appendix 1-7.  
245 NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, GNR.982, 4 December 
2014 (Government Gazette No. 38282). Appendix 1.  
246 NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, GNR.982, 4 December 
2014 (Government Gazette No. 38282). Appendix 2.  
247 NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, GNR.982, 4 December 
2014 (Government Gazette No. 38282). Appendix 6.  
248 NEMA Act 107 of 1998; s24and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, GNR.982, 4 December 
2014 (Government Gazette No. 38282). Appendix 7.  
249 White Paper on Environmental Liability (187:13). 
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damage' should be broad and include activities which may cause significant pollution and risk 
to the environment.  
A definition of 'environmental liabilities' then needs to be drafted, which alludes to 
environmental damage and the requirement to put in place financial provision for the cost 
implication of these damages. The definition in the Environmental Liability White Paper can 
be considered, dividing the environmental liabilities into known and unknown liabilities, 
which will assist operators to distinguish between the different financial provision  
instruments when catering for these liabilities.  It is imperative that the definition of known 
liabilities, over and above the standard remediation and closure obligations, include reference 
to ongoing management obligations in respect of administrative obligation of an operator. 
This will close out the gap for the State or liquidators who may need to assume responsibility 
for a manufacturing operation in the event that the operator cannot meet its obligations. It is 
necessary to point out that in the list of unknown liabilities, administrative notices and 
directives should not be included, as obtaining surety for these may incentivise non-
compliant behaviour.  
The definition of 'financial provisions' as contained in NEMA should also be amended by the 
removal of references to the activities which require financial provision, as these will be 
catered for under the definition of environmental damage and liabilities.250 It should once 
amended, only refer to the purpose of the provisions (i.e 'to cover the cost of environmental 
management and remediation in the event of insolvency and the cost of closure at the end of 
the operating life of a licenses facility') and the financial mechanism which can be utilised by 
operators of high risk industries to provide surety for their environmental liabilities. 
5.2.2 Identifying high risk industries 
It is recommended that a separate list of high risk industries and activities in South Africa 
which cause environmental damage as defined should be established as a main piece of an 
environmental liability regime. This list would include all types of manufacturing plants, 
refineries and the waste dump sites which are utilised by these industries. The list of activities 
                                                 
250 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, s1 – Financial Provision means the insurance, bank guarantee, trust fund or cash 
that applicants for an environmental authorisation must provide in terms of this Act guaranteeing the availability 
of sufficient funds to undertake the (a) rehabilitation of the adverse environmental impacts of the listed or 
specified activities; (b) rehabilitation of the impacts of the prospecting, exploration, mining or production 
activities, including the pumping and treatment of polluted or extraneous water; (c) decommissioning and 
closure of the operations; (d) remediation of latent or residual environmental impacts which become known in 




contained in NEMA251 and the SEMA's could be a starting point for the compilation of the 
list, but it would, however, be necessary to consider the fact that the lists are not 
comprehensive when coving high risk industries and their associated activities.   
5.2.3 Existing facilities and new facilities  
A number of South Africa's industrial manufacturers have histories similar to that of Zincor, 
operating industrial site which predate South Africa's environmental management regulatory 
awakening.252 As such, any legislative reworking would require careful consideration of the 
legislative history of South Africa's high risk industries, so that these industries are not 
exempted or prejudiced by the imposition of an environmental liability regime. It is therefore 
recommended that any environmental liability regime be aligned with the polluter pays 
principle and the current application of s28 of the NEMA and s19 of the NWA.253   
5.2.4 Systematic step wise approach  
A systematic approach to assessing, considering and calculating the cost of environmental 
liabilities should be followed as proposed by the Irish law. The environmental liability regime 
can be introduced to high risk industries in phases over the life of the facility. Firstly, the risk 
assessment could form part of the application requirements for an environmental 
authorisation, whilst the remaining steps could form part of the license to operate conditions 
as illustrated in the Irish EPA waste licenses conditions. The value of a systematic approach 
is that it systemises a very erratic concept to get the best possible outcome for the 
environment in the form of a suitable financial provision. This approach can be defined in 
guideline documents which emphasise the statutory requirements.   
5.2.5 Section 24E and 24P of NEMA 
The "Minimum conditions attached to an Environmental Authorisation" contained in s24E of 
NEMA should be amended to require the authority to include a condition in an environmental 
authorisation which requires applicants of  high risk industries to secure a financial provision 
as referenced in s24P of NEMA. Furthermore, to ensure that the applicant is committed to 
rehabilitation, s24E should also require the authority to include a condition in an 
environmental authorisation which sees the applicant committing to closure expectations for 
                                                 
251 NEMA Act 107 of 1998, GNR 983, 984 and 985 Environmental Impact Regulations (2014). 
252 See Glasweski, J…et al. Environmental Law in South Africa.  2ed. Durban: Lexi Nexis (2016) 3 "South 
Africa passed its first dedicated environmental Statue in the 1980's, which was replaced by the Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989 and is now to a large extent repealed by the National Environmental Management 
Act 107 of 1998". 
253Glazewski J (252: 20-24). 
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the land, already at commencement of activities on the property. This will ensure that the 
applicant understands its commitments and can work towards the end use.  
Furthermore, s24E(c) should be removed and drafted into a stand alone section, which deals 
with transfer of rights and obligations for listed activities and high risk industries. This new 
section should, at minimum, require a formal administrative process to occur for the transfer 
of environmental liabilities and require the receiver to prove they are competent to take over 
the environmental liabilities of the operator. The receiver's competence should specifically be 
linked to the receiver's ability to meet the financial provision obligations of the seller as set 
out in an amended s24P. 
It is also proposed that s24P of NEMA be amended and entitled "Environmental Liabilities, 
Risk Assessment and Financial Provisions" and its objectives broadened to cater for all 
industries identified in the high risk industry list. These industries should however not be 
limited only to listed activities due to historic industries, which may for legal technical 
reasons not have environmental licenses under NEMA or the SEMA's. 
The provision should make financial provisioning for environmental liabilities for all high 
risk activities obligatory, prospective and retrospective. Any new licensable activities should 
be obliged to undertake the systematic assessment as part of the environmental authorisation 
process or as part of a condition in a license, whilst existing operators should be obliged to 
undertake the process over a transitional period.   
The section should also introduce the concept of competency of operators in high risk 
industries, requiring competency to be connected directly with financial liquidity and the 
ability to cater for environmental liabilities. Equally, any financial provision set aside for 
environmental liabilities should be protected from insolvency proceedings, as is currently the 
case under s24P(6).254 Without this protection, the very purpose of the financial provision can 
be undermined by forcing the business into compulsory liquidation, which would expose this 
provision to creditors' claims. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
It is necessary for the natural resources regulatory authorities to take a holistic perspective on 
environmental liability as is regulated by our current natural resource legislation, to ensure 
                                                 
254s24P(6) which provides that " The Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936), does not apply to any form of 
financial provision contemplated in subsection (1) and all amounts arising from that provision." 
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that the proposed recommendations do not create compliance hurdles in other legislative 
areas, such as tax. The benefits in taking the proposed steps towards implementing a holistic 
environmental liability regime are significant. The principle benefits being that polluters, the 
State, purchasers and liquidators involved in high risk industrial sites will be in an improved 
position to meet the environmental duties and administrative obligations of the operation, 
improving protection of the environment and in Larkins words, "balancing the profitability of 
business with the survival of the natural world".255 
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